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ABSTRACT
Increased public attention to environmental disasters is reducing the likelihood firms can
ascribe the consequential damages of stakeholders to “acts of Nature”. This phenomenon
indicates that the absence of top management team (TMT) attention to natural environmental
issues leads a firm to control-reducing and likely-loss threats, but less is known about whether
firms engage in environmental actions in response to technological disasters and why some firms
actively undertake environmental action, while others do not.
Drawing on the attention-based view, I propose that technological disasters that happen
in a focal firm’s affiliated industry cause a TMT to increase a firm’s environmental action, as
mediated by the increased concerns and confidence about natural environmental issues. Using
10-year panel data, I found that TMT attention to the environmental issues was a key cognitive
instrument that links technological disasters and a firm’s protective environmental actions.
Furthermore, family influence and outside directors play critical roles in influencing a TMT to
reframe its sensitive cognitive map on a technological disaster, and thus, to sense the signals
from technological disasters in a strategic perspective.
My findings contribute to research on the attention-based view by applying the view to
the natural environmental context, exploring a possible mediating effect of TMT attention
between technological disasters and a firm’s environmental actions, and empirically testing
conditional effects that will enhance TMT attention and environmental actions. Providing the
framework of how firms become environmentally responsible, I will discuss some insights into
how firms adjust themselves to fit stakeholders’ expectations.
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CHAPTER ONE:
SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE DISSERTATION
The critical role of top management team (TMT) attention to industrial events and
changes such as deregulation and the introduction to technology has been studied by strategy
researchers for decades (e.g., Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008). Indeed, TMT
attention has provided a pivotal consensus about the direction of organizational actions (Ocasio,
1997). Recently, natural environmental issues have been increasingly a focused point for TMTs,
as environmental disasters that damage stakeholders and communities are being vividly captured
and reported by individuals who carry digital recording devices.
For instance, pictures and videos of the collapse of the Fukushima nuclear power plant hit
by a tsunami and the BP oil spill that polluted a massive swath of the Gulf of Mexico in 2010
quickly spread out through social networking services, and then public criticisms against the
firms were heightened. Due to the technology development, a natural environment segment that
TMTs are facing has radically changed and charges overwhelming clean-up and follow-up
protection costs to corresponding firms (de Villiers, Naiker, & van Staden, 2011).
Unlike competitive pressures that present both opportunities and threats (Sharma, 2000),
environmental disasters that are characterized by sudden and devastating threats to organizations
and stakeholders may require a TMT to experience a different decision-making process than the
normal decision-making process that focuses on competitive events. However, there is little
empirical research on determinants of TMT attention to natural environmental issues that
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possibly lead a firm to be committed to environmentally responsible actions for the prevention of
the occurrence of technological disasters.
Research Objectives
Because a technological disaster is an industry-level phenomenon that influences all firms within
an industry directly or indirectly through a shared reputation and a common fate (Barnett &
King, 2008), a study on a firm-level internal process by which disastrous events are attended to
by managers will be able to advance our understanding of the impact of unusual events that have
been away from the primary domain where firms usually focus (e.g., industry) (Rerup, 2009), but
are increasingly influential so that firms’ continuity could be threatened when environmental
issues are less attended to(e.g., Freedom Industries filing for Chapter 11).
Researchers have examined why and how some events in relation to the natural
environment generate the public attention inside and outside of an accident industry (Hoffman &
Ocasio, 2001; Nigam & Ocasio, 2010). Regarding a disaster as an event, Maitlis and Sonenshein
(2010) examine how an accident firm enacts its environment and goes through sensemaking
process, but few studies have investigated and empirically tested how other firms operating in
the same industry with an accident firm respond to a disaster by attending to and taking actions
against relevant issues to the natural environment. Furthermore, little is known about why
managers are encouraged to integrate environmental issues with a strategic planning process,
how a technological disaster affects managerial attention, and under what conditions the level of
impact gets stronger enough to activate a firm’s action responding to disasters.
A better understanding of why TMTs pay more attention to environmental issues in a
decision-making process motivates me to develop a hypothesized model (See Figure 1) and to
address the following four research questions; 1) Do firms respond to industry-wide
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technological disasters caused by an accident firm operating in the same industry? 2) Why and
how do firms respond to technological disasters in different manners? 3) Does TMT attention
mediate a technological disaster and a firm’s environmental action as a response? And 4) Under
what conditions is the mediating effect of TMT attention on the relationship stronger or weaker?

Figure 1 – Theoretical Model

Drawing on the attention-based view (Ocasio, 1997), I theorize and empirically test the
impact of a technological disaster on TMT attention to natural environmental issues and how a
TMT is motivated to adopt preventive strategic actions. Particularly, social and cognitive
processes constituting the attention-based view could provide better explanations and insights
into the effects of interactions among multiple managers in TMT or TMT managers on attention
3

to environments (Cho & Hambrick, 2006) I argue that attention plays a crucial role in
promoting an organization-wide support for the development of environmental competency and
protection. Considering the importance of TMT attention, I propose that attention to natural
environmental issues fully mediates the relationship between the occurrence of technological
disasters and a firm’s environmental actions. This implies that the TMT attention that acts not
only as firm-level motivation but also a champion for highly risky environmental initiatives is a
necessary condition for the development of environmental actions for a firm’s continuity
(Andersson & Bateman, 2000; Ren & Guo, 2011).
My work will contribute to conceptualizing TMT attention to the natural environment
and to establishing its mediating role between a technological disaster and a choice of
environmental actions. Ultimately, it will contribute to extending the attention-based view by
incorporating the view into the environmental management literature. Using panel data, I will
test the net effect of a technological disaster and examine a significant different in TMT attention
between firms influenced by the disaster and those not. Furthermore, I will also explore the
boundary conditions of TMT attention by analyzing the conditional effect of corporate
governance and vicarious learning on environmental actions, as mediated by TMT attention.
Lastly, by highlighting the distinguishable effects of technological disasters from these of other
types of disasters, this study advances our understanding of why firms actively but selectively
respond to an environmental disaster.
I begin by defining a technological disaster and reviewing the attention-based view
literature to examine why a TMT attends to a limited number of issues while forgoing others. I
discuss how corporate governance and vicarious learning moderate the impact of technological
disasters on TMT attention to natural environmental issues. I next describe methods and samples
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to be utilized in this research, and conclude with the implication for future research in the
environmental management literature.
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CHAPTER TWO:
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
Environmental Disaster
Environmental disasters have been studied with different labels, including massive
discontinuous change (Winn et al., 2011), socio-technological disaster (Richardson, 1994), largescale organizational crisis (Pearson & Clair, 1998), and technological hazard (Appendix A). A
majority of definitions indicate that an environmental disaster is a cause of perceived crisis and
characterized by low probability of occurrence but high impact on communal environments and
stakeholders as well as a responsible firm for the disaster (Pearson & Clair, 1998). Therefore,
the occurrences of environmental disasters do necessarily involve considerable stakeholders’
perceptions on crisis, which are assumed to vary across the types of disaster, as well as lead to
the sensemaking process of accident firms (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010; Weick, 2010)
While various definitions of an environmental disaster have been made in both
management and non-management literatures, as shown in Appendix A, few studies have
defined a technological disaster, particularly in the management literature and the border
between a technological disaster and other types of disasters has been blurred (Shaluf, Ahmadun,
& Said, 2003). Distinguishing a technological disaster from others by definition and developing
its construct is fundamental to advancing our understanding of the impact, mechanism, and role
of a technological disaster caused by technical failures of a firm. For the purpose, it is
worthwhile to note that a common effect observed across various types of environmental
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disasters is damages of organizations and communities in the three typical patterns of
environmental disaster – natural, sequential, and technological.
Natural Disaster
The first type of environmental disasters is natural disasters, caused by a force of nature
(i.e., flood, earthquake, etc.). Natural disasters directly damage visible assets such as properties,
plants, and equipment of organizations. For example, tsunamis engulf an industrial complex as
well as residential areas, tornados and typhoons sweep inventory storages and manufacturing
facilities, and landslides bury plants and groups of people. The economic and non-economic
damages occurred due to a natural disaster do not involve health problems that could remain for
a long-term period due to oil and chemical spills and air contamination following the disasters
(Boin, Van Duin, & Heyse, 2001). Natural disasters are considered uncontrollable acts of Nature
and may directly generate massive damages to environments (Strömberg, 2007).
Sequential Disaster
The second type of environmental disasters includes the disasters that initially hit and
destroy properties, plants, and equipment of firms and then create second-order larger impacts on
communities in various manners that toxic chemicals leaked from the destroyed facilities are
spread throughout broad geographical areas. One example of the damages of second-order
impacts is the radioactive leakage from destroyed Fukushima nuclear plants by the tsunami that
hit the Eastern ocean of Japan in 2011 (Dauer et al., 2011). The boundary of second-order
impacts extends to the distribution of secondary stakeholders who do not have “a formal
contractual bond with the firm or direct legal authority over the firm” (Eesley & Lenox, 2006).
The second-order impacts of a disastrous event trigger indirect turmoil into the quality of lives
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for secondary stakeholders due to low attention to issues related to environment concerns (Walls,
Berrone, & Phan, 2012).
When natural disasters directly hit facilities, they often inflict second-order impacts upon
local communities by releasing environmentally hazardous substances into the natural
environment, such as chemical release from plants in Louisiana damaged by Hurricane Katrina
in 2005 and Hurricane Gustav in 2008. The problem with second-order impacts can be found in
a societal phenomenon that a sequential disaster resulting from a natural disaster often brings
about debates as to whether firms are responsible for the economic and environmental damages
that initiated by natural disasters. For example, on March 11, 2011, the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear power plant was hard hit by an earthquake and ensuing Tsunami. The first-order impacts
of the Japanese Tsunami gave rise to a series of collapses of power facilities at the Fukushima
Nuclear Power Plant (Aldrich, 2012). As a result, the cooling system was disabled, causing the
reactors to overheat and significant radiation leaks to spread out into the surrounding Fukushima
area and eventually far off into the Pacific Ocean (Dauer et al., 2011).
The case brought by the earthquake and an ensuing Tsunami in Fukushima, Japan,
demonstrates the seriousness of second-order impacts of a natural disaster - radiation leakage. It
is notable that low identifiability of the direct association between acts of Nature and the
consequential damage may lead the TMT members of the Tokyo Electricity Power (TEP) to
perceive the second-order impacts that leave economic and environmental damages unavoidable.
The concept of identifiability has been mainly explored in the micro-level management studies
focusing on the social loafing in organizations (e.g., Liden et al., 2004). When tasks assigned to
individuals are identifiable, individuals tend to reduce social loafing because their effort is
recognizable so that they could be more responsible for assigned tasks. In the macro-level
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management studies, an identifiable state refers to “assignment of identity that differentiates it (a
current state) from what existed before” (Ford & Ford, 1994: p.767).

Shrivastava (1987)

suggests that in order for an event to cause a crisis, a specific event should be “identifiable in
time and place and traceable to specific man-made causes” (p.8).
When an event is not highly associated with damages, stakeholders who cannot
differentiate the specific association from others tend to incorrectly ascribe the cause of damages
to any firm in the same category or industry (Zavyalova et al., 2012). In that sense, a firm’s
active engagement in internal investigation with regard to environmental disasters could leave
stakeholders an imprecise clue that the firm engaged has at least a partial responsibility for the
disaster when a low identifiable disaster happens. Thus, the low identifiability tends to make
firms less responsive to an environmental disaster and does not lead them to adopt proactive
environmental actions.
Technological Disaster
The last type of environmental disasters represents the case that an environmental disaster
takes place due to technological mistakes and causes massive damages to communal
environments (Roberts, 1990; Reed & Fitzgerald, 2011). For the most part, human,
organizational, and technical factors are identified as factors that cause a technological disaster
(Shrivastava, Mitroff, & Miller, 1988). The BP Deepwater Horizon Oil spill that contaminated
the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 and the chemical spill into West Virginia’s Elk River by Freedom
Industries in 2014 are classified into this category.
The Deepwater Horizon was a semisubmersible offshore drilling rig that was contracted
to BP by Transocean. The rig was capable of drilling wells in excess of 35,000 feet while
operating in water depths up to 10,000 feet. It was operating in 5,000 feet of water on an oil well
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(Baiocchi & Welser, 2010). On April 20, 2010, Deepwater Horizon exploded and sank, as a
remote switch failed to activate a blowout preventer. By late May, the destroyed well was
estimated to leak 30,000 to 60,000 barrels of crude oil a day (Reed & Fitzgerald, 2011). Given
that if the blowout preventer had properly functioned, the massive leakage from the Deepwater
Horizon must not have occurred. Therefore, the BP oil spill case can be classified as a
technological disaster caused by an identifiable malfunction of a remote switch that ultimately
led to marine pollution in the Gulf of Mexico (Reed & Fitzgerald, 2011).
Similarly, the Freedom industries case also illustrates that a technological failure to
prevent a one-inch hole in the bottom of a storage tank from which hazardous chemicals were
released into the Elk River ultimately left more than a hundred residents who were damaged
from contaminated drinking water and experienced related diseases such as nausea, headaches,
burning skin, rash, etc. (The Washington Post, Jan 10, 2014). Therefore, the common attribute
of both cases was what the public could understand and identify the link between the explosion
of the Deepwater Horizon for BP and the one-inch hole at Freedom Industries and resulting
massive oil and chemical spills. According to Hoffman and Ocasio (2001), social salience of an
event is created when outsiders of an accident industry can attribute direct accountability to the
industry (i.e., identifiability) or when insiders of the industry can examine an accident as a threat
to the industry’s image (i.e., damage) The direct association between a man-made error and
environmental and non-environmental damages heightened public attention to an accident firm
and its industry (Barnett & King, 2008), thus igniting TMTs operating in the same industry to
perceive the possibility of receiving greater penalty from the public if similar technological
disasters are repeated, thus damaging its industry image and identity (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001).
As illustrated in Figure 2, the identifiable causality between a man-made cause and massive
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damages is the attribute of a technological disaster, distinguishable from the attributes of a
natural disaster and a sequential disaster.

Figure 2 – Classification of Environmental Disasters by Event

Following previous disaster studies in the crisis management literature (e.g., Richardson,
1994; Robert, 1990; Weick, 1988), I define a technological disaster as an extensive and lowprobability disruption to stakeholders and the natural environment made by controllable
organizational and technological failure. The definition indicates that organizational and
technological failure (e.g., oil spill occurred by man-made mistake) alone does not fulfill the
conditions of being classified as a disaster. Instead, when a technological failure causes
economic and non-economic damages massive enough to trigger the public attention from
stakeholders, the catastrophic event is classified as a disaster (Roberts, 1990; Richardson, 1994)
and is critical to shaping organizational attention to relevant issues (Gavetti et al. 2012; Ocasio,
2011). Furthermore, regarding the disruption shown in the definition of a technological disaster,
this study adopts an operational definition suggested by the Center for Research on the
Epidemiology of Disaster at the Universite Catholique de Louvain in Belgium. By definition, an
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extensive disruption to stakeholders includes at least one of the following criteria: “10 or more
people are reported killed; 100 or more people are reported affected, injured, and/or homeless;
the government declares a state of emergency; the government requests international assistance.”
With regard to a similar construct, a technological disaster is conceptually different from
wrongdoing, which is defined as a firm’s behaviors that “place a firm’s stakeholders at risk and
violates their expectation of societal norms and general standards of conduct” (Zavyalova et al.,
2012: p. 1080). Industry wrongdoing is related to quality that exists when a firm’s offerings
meet or exceed stakeholder’s expectation. When a firm intentionally or unintentionally violates
customer expectation by providing defective products, wrongdoing happens. When that
happens, an accident firm makes compensation to stakeholders in a way of product recall
(Zavyalova et al., 2012). Meanwhile, a technological disaster is disruptive and unprecedented so
that the violation of social contract cannot be applied to an accident firm which may or may not
have fulfilled stakeholders’ expectations. When a technological disaster happens, a responsible
firm ends up transferring damages to stakeholders in a way of social cost.
Technological Disasters and Environmental Actions
As the primary purpose of this study is to explore the mediating effect of TMT attention
to natural environmental issues in the environmental decision-making process, the first thing to
be done is to establish a theoretical association between a technological disaster and a firm’s
environmental action. That is, if no theoretical relationship exists between a technological
disaster and a firm’s environmental action, TMT attention has nothing to mediate (Mathieu &
Taylor, 2006)1.

1

Mathieu & Taylor (2006) distinguish indirect and mediating relationships. Unlike a mediation relationship, an
indirect relationship does not necessarily demonstrate the direct effect of an independent variable and a dependent
variable. As indirect effect includes a chain of events such that technological disaster affects TMT attention, which,
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Research in the environmental management literature has seen a preventive
environmental action as a firm’s effort to nurture capabilities for environmental competency
(Hart, 1995; Hart & Dowell, 2011). The anticipated outcomes of the action include
organizational efficiency/productivity and increased financial performance. Meanwhile, a
protective environmental action mainly seeks environmental legitimacy, which is achieved when
stakeholders believe that a focal firm’s business objectives and practices at least fulfill their
expectations (Suchman, 1995). According to Chattopadhyay, Glick, and Huber (2001),
organizational actions are made depending on whether managers perceive an event as a threat.
Specifically speaking, when TMTs perceive events as either a threat to market control or a firm’s
profitability, they actively take actions to avoid or reduce threats. Under the circumstances
where the causes of a technological disasters are readily identified and attributed to a firm, a
TMT perceives a technological failure that could cause economic and environmental damages as
a salient threat and ascertains that a firm’s intentional or unintentional involvement would result
in the loss of firm’s performance and market share (McMullen, Shepherd, & Patzelt, 2009), as
well as the loss of legitimacy (Deephous & Carter, 2005). These unrealized threats motivate a
TMT to seek either internal or external strategic actions, and the choice depends on the type of
expected losses (Shinkle, 2012).
When a TMT perceives a threat to market share of its firm, it tends to take internallyoriented actions by strengthening the quality, productivity, and efficiency of its products and
attempts to alleviate control-reducing threats (Chattopadhyay et al., 2001). To offset negative
perception of control-reducing threat from the a technological disaster, a TMT enhances
internally-oriented environmental actions in a way that a firm reduces wastes and defects by

in turn, affects a firm’s environmental action, the direct effect of the disaster on a firm’s action is not prerequisite for
an indirect effect.
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integrating environmental management into a manufacturing process. This environmental action
increases a firm’s control in a manufacturing process by reducing defects, a competitive
advantage in a competitive market by increasing productivity and efficiency, and a social
responsibility in a general environment by stabilizing its organizational operation.
Similarly, a TMT can perceive likely-loss threats due to its firm’s involvement in causing
technological disaster. The likely-loss threat implies that causing a technological disaster could
result in losses of customers, reputation, and performances. According to threat-rigidity
hypothesis (Chattopadhyay et al., 2001; Ocasio, 1995), when likely-loss threats are perceived, a
TMT tends to choose externally-oriented actions to keep its market power from uncertainties.
To offset the negative perception from the likely-loss threat of a technological disaster, a TMT
enhances externally-oriented environmental actions in a way that a firm nurtures environmental
competency and develop environmental stewardship that requires experience and knowledge of
preventive environmental actions (Hart, 1995).
Lastly, a TMT perceives legitimacy-loss threats due to environmental disaster caused by
technological failure. Unlike reputation, which is based on a firm’s competency, legitimacy is
present only when a firm is “meeting and adhering to the expectations of a social system’s norm,
values, rules, and meanings” (Deephouse and Carter, 2005: p.331). This indicates that as long as
a firm abides by desirable and appropriate value in a societal system, it can survive at least by
getting favorable exchange conditions that delegitimized firms cannot obtain. A firm seeking
environmental legitimacy rather than competency tends to exert their efforts to meet minimal
requirements specified by stakeholders. This environmental action at least enables the firm to
avoid being criticized for having been irresponsible for environmental issues when technological
disaster happens, and the action is referred to as a protective environmental action.
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Attention-Based View
Proposed by Simon (1976) and March and Simon (1958), individual level of attention in
an organization has been long discussed. Assuming the bounded rationality of a decision-maker
constituting three central concepts – satisficing, search, and routinization (Gavetti et al., 2012),
behavioral theorists focus on how managers set organizational goals and how they behave to
achieve those goals under uncertainty. In the behavioral theory of the firm, subjective salience
plays a critical role in determining the level of organizational goals, and managerial attentions of
decision-maker are based on the salience (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008; Shinkle, 2012).
As a complementary view to the behavioral theory of the firm, the attention-based view
assumes an organization as systems of structurally distributed attention in which cognitions and
actions of individuals are derived from organizational contexts and situations and define
organization-level attention as “the noticing, encoding, interpreting, and focusing of time and
effort by organizational decision-makers on both issues … and answers” (Ocasio, 1997; p.189).
The attention is shaped by a firm’s formal, informal structures, routines, procedures,
communication channel, as well as organizational goals (Cho & Hambrick, 2006). The selective
attention to organizational issues and initiatives leads to decision-making and, ultimately, a
firm’s competitive advantage (Ocasio & Joseph, 2005).
This view enlarges determinants of organizational attention to include social-cognitive
and structural processes that encode, understand and focus efforts and time on external stimuli in
different manners (Barreto, 2013; Ocasio, 1997). This view provides the lens that links events in
general environments and strategic actions by explaining why organizations selectively pay
attention to a few events, how organizational contexts create distinguishable internal situations
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that facilitate communication and interactions among TMT managers, and how firms distribute
that attention in response to external environments (Ocasio, 1997).
In the attention-based view, external environments are viewed as the source that provides
an unlimited number of events (Ocasio 2011). Meanwhile firms are characterized by their limited
ability to identify, understand and process all information from environments (Cyert & March,
1963). Thus, firms are assumed to selectively attend to a few events by coordinating structural,
social, and cognitive processes of attention and adapt to the environment (Levinthal & Rerup,
2006; Ocasio, 1997; Rerup, 2009). It indicates that the attention-based view provides an
alternative perspective of a firm’s action to the theories that emphasize environmental
determinism, since the action is driven by what issues and answers a TMT focuses its attention
on, the focus of attention determined by the organizational context in which the firm is situated
and the governance structure that influences a TMT’s problem framing (Ocasio, 1997; Thomas,
Clark, & Gioia, 1993). Ocasio (1997) conceptualizes the view by proposing three principles of
organization-level attention.
Three Principles of Organization-Level Attention
Selective Attention as Manifestation of Individual Cognition
Following the assumption of the behavioral theory of the firm, Ocasio (2011) assumes
that firms cannot equally distribute attention to all possible external events and proposes that
they selectively attend to a limited number of strong cues and ignore others, the attention referred
to as selective attention. The assumption behind the relationship between the presence of
numerous external stimuli and selective attention is that a TMT, consisting of managers who
have bounded rationality, focuses its attention on the limited stimuli based on salience (Cyert &
March, 1963). It is notable that actual events are not necessarily influence a TMT turn its
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attention to relevant issues unless a TMT perceives the events as salient (Lampel, Shamsie, &
Shapira, 2009). When the event is perceived as salient (Elsbach, Barr, & Hargadon, 2005), a
TMT labels and categorizes the event into its routinized cognitive framework through enactment
in the process of sensemaking (Weick, 1988; Weick & Sutcliff, 2006; Weick, Sutcliff, &
Obstfeld, 2005).
Sensemaking is “the process of social construction that occurs when discrepant cues
interrupt individual ongoing activities, and involves the retrospective development of plausible
meanings that rationalize what people are doing” (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010; p.551). When
organization focuses a problematic situation that is interrupted by an unexpected event, people
materialize this uncertain situation by giving a meaning and transform it to a problem by labeling
and categorizing the situation (Weick, 1995), and the problem that was labeled and categorized
places relevant issues on an agenda to attend to (Lüscher & Lewis, 2008).
From the perspective of sensemaking, a disastrous event such as a technological disaster
is enacted, rather than encountered (Maitlis & Sorenshein, 2010; Weick, 1993). The term
enactment describes the process by which people conceptualize an event that was not categorized
in cognition by setting aside portions of cognitive repertoire and symbolize the conceptualized
event to reinforce its meaning for further attention (Weick, 1988). As the result of the enactment
process, people in an organization have the enacted environment where the symbolized event is
assigned significance and meaning and is linked to future actions. Thus, enactment process
enables people to commonly attend to an event by facilitating individuals to make more sense of
it through categorization and symbolization (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Weick (1993) used the
disaster that 13 U.S. Forest Service Smokejumpers died in the process of extinguishing forest fire
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in rugged mountain to examine why sensemaking of a highly trained team was collapsed and
suggested that the emergent situation was not properly noticed and enacted.
Enactment is referred to as both a process and a product that are produced as people act
upon a new threat in routinized activities (Weick, 1988). The discrepancy between changed
environments due to a new threat and ongoing activities facilitates enactment that includes the
activities of constructing, categorizing, and prioritizing a problematic event (Lampel, Shamsie, &
Shapira, 2009), which are the foundation for the selection of meanings (Gephart, 1993; Weick et
al., 2005) and for organizational change (Lüscher & Lewis, 2008). According to Lüscher &
Lewis (2008), the whole process of sensemaking by which people enact, interpret, and select is
differentially shaped by organizational identity – who we are, as identity determines what we
enact, how we understand and interpret, and what we act (Ocasio, 1997). In sum, a disruptive
event that provides TMT managers with a salient signal leads a TMT to go through enactment
process and then to have a selective attention to a few issues that were prioritized through
enactment.
Situated Attention as Manifestation of Contextual Influence
Secondly, Ocasio (1997) proposes situated attention. What a TMT focuses on and how it
behaves is shaped by its external and internal contexts of organizations (Barnett, 2008; Ocasio,
2011). According to Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgreen (1990), the impact of signals from an event
on attention and action of signal recipients varies depending on the situation where the recipient
and the event are commonly located. If the situation is supportive of what the event intends to
imply, the event could draw recipient attention via supportive situations. For organizations
influenced by different types of internal and external situations including competitive dynamics
(Dess and Beard, 1994), absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), slack resources
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(Greve, 2008), and geographic distance from an event (Baum, Li, & Usher, 2000), the intensity
of situated attention could vary across organizations.
The extent to which a TMT focuses its attention on an issue varies depending on the
contextual determinants such as firm performance (Tuggle et al., 2010) and growth (Greve,
2008), which play a crucial role in strengthening situated attention by facilitating insiders to
discuss the situation they are located in (Ocasio, 1997), and the speed at which an industry
changes (Nardkarni & Barr, 2009). Nardkarni and Barr suggested that high velocity
environments lead to attention to competitive and market environments. Plourde, Parker, and
Schaan (2013) examine the circumstances where expatriates helps overseas subsidiary to attract
headquarters’ attention.

The context influences participants in a discussion in concert with the

symbol of language that represents meaning or substance (Geertz, 1973), and the integration of
an issue with symbolism facilitates them to categorize it in a communication channel (Gioia et
al., 1994).
The more TMT managers perceive to be situated together, the more they tend to
intensively share and communicate what they focus time and efforts on, then forming an
attention emerged from a communication channel (Ocasio, 1997; 2012). In this process, they
interact, engage in communication, and influence one another (Ocasio 1997) and tend to have
homogenous attention to events in the channel. The emerged, situated attention is reflected
through the internal communication channel in which some forms of cognitive schema and
contexts surrounding an organization interact and elicit participants to experience sensemaking
processes (Elsbach, Barr, & Hargadon, 2005) and to determine what individual behave (Cialdini,
Kallgreen, & Reno, 1991) In sum, internal and external environments determines the intensity
of signals from an event that will be shared and discussed in communication channels. While
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interacting and communicating among insider, situated attention is emerged from the channel.
The intensity of situated attention to a specific event and relevant issues could vary according to
the extent to which signals from an event are relayed.
Structural Distribution of Attention as Manifestation of Structural Process
The third principle is a structural distribution of attention, which suggests that the rules,
resources, and players of a firm govern social, economic and cultural mechanisms that vary
across firms (Barnett, 2008; Ocasio, 1997). The mechanisms distribute and control the channels
of decision making through which TMT managers interact (Ocasio 1997). As forms of
communicative exchange, governance channels shape the attention of decision makers and thus
lead to change in strategic direction, and the formal channels generate informal channels, and the
interconnection across formal and informal channels guides strategy formulation (Ocasio &
Joseph, 2005). According to the authors, as channels are embedded in organizational social and
economic structure consists of rules, resources, and people, attentions of TMT managers
surrounded by governance channels are socially structured and thus focused on selective issues
enacted by people who allocate rules and resources.
A TMT, standing in the middle of the mechanisms, evaluates and legitimizes issues that
are rushed in from both inside and outside of its organization by being influenced by
communication channels embedded in those mechanisms (Ren & Guo, 2011). This attention
process is closely related to issue selling, which is referred to as “the process by which
individuals affect others’ attention to and understanding of the events, developments, and trends
that have implications for organizational performance” (Dutton et al., 2001: p. 716). As interests
and identities are structured through the network of formal and informal channels, the structures
of TMT attention is determined by how organizational players control and distribute the
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allocation of interests and identities. As a result, the allocation of identities and interest of TMT
managers is an underlying determinant to their enactment, understanding, and interpreting
environments and, furthermore, strategic directions.
From the perspective of bounded rationality of managers, a TMT relies on logic
(Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), embeddeness in institution (Hung, 2005), structure and structure
(Kabanoff & Brown, 2008), identity and image (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001), players (Maula, Keil,
& Zahra, 2013), procedures, rules, resources and processes when it selects issues initiated by
both inside and outside stakeholders (Dutton et al., 2001). Thornton and Ocasio (1999) posit that
an editorial logic as an institutional logic influences executives to focus their attention on authoreditor relationships, whereas market logic influences them to focus more on issues of resource
competition and organizational growth. Observing organizational attention of Taiwanese IT
firms, Hung (2005) found the extent to which firms are embedded in institutional environments
influence the firm to pay more attention to institutional environment when entering into a new
market. Hoffman and Ocasio (2001) posit that public attention is shaped when an event damages
industrial identity and image. Kabanoff and Brown (2008) suggest that strategic configuration of
clusters of strategic elements determines organizational attention. Regarding players, Maula et al.
(2013) suggest that corporate venture capital leads to TMT attention to technological
discontinuity. These examples implies that top-down or schema driven TMT attention that is
influenced by the individuals or groups who are eligible to distribute routines, procedures, and
rules by governing resources and processes. In this process, a TMT dissolves its existing
problem framing on issues and reframes it to interpret issues and the whole process is based on
its organizational interests and identities (Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Ocasio, 1997).
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Technological Disasters Affecting TMT Attention:
Hypotheses Development
In the process of framing a TMT’s cognitive framework, managers subjectively prioritize
issues and answers in accordance with the salience of events (Daft & Weick, 1984; Weick,
Sutcliff, & Obstfeld, 2005). Despite their affiliation with the same organization, the degree to
which managers view natural environmental issues as salient varies from individual to
individual before a technological disaster happens.

After a salient event is noticed, TMT

managers reconstruct homogeneous and consistent cognitive repertoires of categories and make
more sense of issues relevant to the noticed event (Ocasio, 1997; Weick, 1995). The more
disruptive an event is, the more likely a TMT is to enact its environment and adjust a cognitive
framework with new priorities and implications for future actions (Arrfelt, Wiseman, & Hult,
2013), rather than to rely on routinized framework (Weick & Sutcliff, 2006).
Causing economic, human, and environmental damages and characterized by identifiable
causality, a technological disaster gives rise to social salience in an accident industry (Hoffman
& Ocasio, 2001) and facilitates the enactment process of TMT managers (Ocasio, 1997), as the
disaster causes crises and “a collective breakdown in sense making” (Pearson & Clair, 1998: p.
64). Hoffman & Ocasio (2001) define social salience as “the prominence or importance of a
stimulus to a particular context” (p.429). The attribution of accountability and the pressures
from insiders and outsiders of an affiliated industry who condemn an accident firm create social
salience that serves as an implicit rule that possibly regulates the firms operating in the same
industry with an accident firm (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; Zavyalova et al., 2012).
When a salient event is noticed, organizations, at least, “consider the type of request
being made and the type of problem being faced… and what role they are playing in a particular
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context” (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006: p. 507) and encode issues ingenerated by a technological
disaster into cognitive repertoire of categories. When existing routinized processes and ongoing
activities cannot effectively address the situation caused by the occurrence of a technological
disaster, decision-makers go through mindful enactment (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006). According
to Weick, Sutcliff, and Obstfeld (2005), categorizing and labeling the problematic situation
enables managers to be more oriented and closer to possible signals created by an event for close
attention and deploy cognitive repertoire of categories that is amenable to functional activities.
Therefore, a sensemaking process triggered by a technological disaster has a TMT differentiate a
natural environment segment from other segments and materializes a problematic situation as an
issue.
I suggest that the salience of a technological disaster elicits TMTs who work in the same
industry where a technological disaster occurs to go through enactment process by which issues
that are relevant to technological disasters are prioritized and focused in accordance with the
salience (Weick, 1995). By definition, a technological disaster means an extensive and lowprobability disruption to the natural environment and stakeholders, leaving environmental and
economic damages. In a narrow sense, environmental issues include only problematic situations
surrounding business classified by Anderson and Bateman (2002) such as air pollution, solid
waste disposal, topsoil erosion, ozone depletion, pollution growth, marine and fresh water
pollution, toxic waste accumulation and disposal, reduction in biodiversity, wetland destruction,
deforestation, and climate modification. Meanwhile, drawing on the definition of Ocaiso’s
(1997) organizational attention could enlarge the range of natural environmental issues by
including the answers to corresponding environmental problematic situation such as proprietary
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environmental programs and technologies, business practices of treating wastes, environmental
regulations, and so on.
As a central entity of triggering technological disasters, organizations have been
criticized for transferring social costs to the natural environment and experienced negative
spillover that happens when a firm do harm to the reputation intertwined with other firms in the
same industry (Barnett & King, 2008; Yu, Sengul, & Lester, 2008). Furthermore, the negative
spillover effect is more intensified, as outsiders of an industry tend to ambiguously categorize
and attribute the damages of an accident to an industry as a whole (Zavyalova et al., 2012).
Given that an issue is “a development, event, or trend perceived as potentially having an
impact on the organization” (Bansal, 2003: p.511) and organization’s problems and opportunities
(Ocasio & Joseph, 2005), the occurrence of a technological disaster could lead other firms
operating in the same industry to attend to the issues that are adversely affected by a
technological disaster as a negative, potential impact on organizations through stakeholders
(Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; Nigam & Ocasio, 2010). Therefore, salience of a technological
disaster leads a TMT to focus time and efforts on natural environmental issues. Therefore,
Hypothesis 1: Technological disaster is positively associated with TMT attention to
natural environmental issues

A Contingency Framework of TMT Attention to Natural Environmental Issues
Corporate Governance
The underlying concept of a structural distribution of attention is how a TMT attends to
depends on how the organization distributes and controls the allocation of communications and
procedures (Ocasio, 1997). The distribution of communication channel structured by
organizational rules, resources, and players shapes TMT attention to issues (Barnett, 2008;
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Ocasio, 1997). According to Ocasio (1997), the structure of attention facilitates TMT managers
to go through the enactment of the environment by structurally distributing interests and
identities of TMT managers (Ocasio, 1997). It suggests that TMTs vary in the extent that they
attended to an issue, and the degree of TMT attention to an issue is determined by attentional
structure, and the structure shapes a problem framing of TMT managers by distributing and
controlling the allocation of communication channel along with personal identities and interests
of TMT managers (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Ocasio, 1997).
Corporate governance including influences of a founder’s family and controlling
shareholders, composition of directors, and effective controls of CEO renders some events more
salient to TMT managers. The salience, in turn, serves as an implicit rule within an organization
that enforces TMT managers to be more attentive to related issues and answers (Hoffman &
Ocasio, 2001). When TMT managers perceive threats from a technological disaster as greater
due to its organizational governance, they enact their own cognitive framework and reprioritize
relevant issues to the disaster in response to an low-probability and sudden disruptive threat
(Chattopadhyay et al., 2001; Weick & Sutcliff, 2006).
Throughout the process by which a TMT notices a technological disaster and focuses its
attention on natural environmental issues, a firm-specific structural distribution of attention
formed by governance characteristics substantially influences TMT managers to build a negative
problem framing on technological disasters and to be highly sensitive to technological disasters.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a TMT has different level of attention to natural
environmental issues depending on corporate governance. I propose that ownership dispersal,
family influence, outside directors, and non CEO duality build a negative problem prospect on a
technological threat, thus eliciting a TMT to be more attentive to natural environmental issues.
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Ownership Concentration
Ownership concentration refers to the extent to which outstanding shares are
concentrated in the hands of blockholders who can effectively monitor management and affect
the overall direction of strategy (Dam & Scholtens, 2013). High ownership concentration that
effectively eliminates information asymmetry between shareholders and management was found
to discourage the agency behaviors of managers who could otherwise prioritize their personal
interests over a firm’s interest by monitoring management (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). For another
attribute, controlling shareholders own significant amount of equity positions in their invested
firms, which constrains them from flexibly disposing their equity positions at the desirable price.
Alternatively, they tend to tolerate short-term unprofitability as long as long-term payouts
are expected. When controlling shareholders as a provider of a valuable resource identify
strategic decisions of invested firms is conflicting to their long-term investment intention, they
increase stakeholder salience to a TMT and influence a direction of managerial decision by
exercising their powerful, legitimate, and urgent claims (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997) rather
than withdrawing their ownership positions from the firm. A TMT under controlling
shareholders or blockholders holding a majority of ownership may have a negative problem
framing on a technological disaster and attend it as adversely affecting long-term performances.
Therefore, when ownership is highly concentrated to blockholders, a TMT is more likely to
facilitate enactment by which natural environmental issues are prioritized (Weick, 1995).
Hypothesis 2: Ownership concentration will positively moderate the technological
disaster and TMT attention relationship.
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Outside Director
The primary role of the board of directors is to effectively fulfill their control over and
service tasks for management, which includes offering advice and counsel to a TMT (Forbes &
Milliken, 1999). I suggest these two roles have a significant implication for TMT attention to
natural environmental issues. Inside directors are identified as being dependent of a TMT due to
an inconvenient position to monitor TMT performance regularly, a loyalty they have long
exhibited to TMT managers, and possible losses of personal interest (Johnson, Daily, and
Ellstrand, 1996). For outside directors, however, their independence makes it possible to freely
suggest adjusting strategic orientations and to propose alternatives to the existing policies
maintained by a TMT (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). This indicates that the more outside directors
engage in the governance, the more diversified interests, perspective, and professional
knowledge are (Johnson & Greening, 1999).
The presence of outside directors who bring in various perspectives and knowledge
increase the possibility that a firm notices and encodes possible threats that had been
unrecognized before outside directors were present in the board. Further, it gives more weights
to managing threats that are ultimately directed to stakeholders who have a wide range of the
needs (Johnson et al., 1996). For a TMT whose decisions and performances are monitored and
influenced by outside directors, its internally oriented attention to pursue self-interests is
discouraged, while its externally oriented attention tends to be encouraged due to a established
problem frame that encodes and interprets environmental concerns as salient to be able to
adversely affect the relationship with stakeholders and to result in deteriorated quality of
environments (Walls et al., 2012). A TMT under outside directors evaluates a technological
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disaster as a risk that adversely affects its interests and identities and is more likely to facilitate
enactment by which natural environmental issues are prioritized.
Hypothesis 3: Outside directors will positively moderate the technological disaster and
TMT attention relationship.
CEO Duality
CEO duality is referred to as the situation where “the same person holds the titles of CEO
and chairperson of the board of directors in a corporation” (Tuggle et al., 2010: p. 951). This
situation reduces monitoring of board of directors (BOD) toward management by engaging in
both management and control (Tuggle et al., 2010). Lowering the intensity of BOD monitoring
over managerial decisions through the duality, CEO can take actions opposed to shareholders’
interests by taking advantage of his/her enhanced discretion (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004).
Since CEO is internally oriented and focuses on the performances that could improve its
compensation (Mallette & Fowler, 1992), it possibly promotes CEO entrenchment that occurs
when CEO is so powerful as to earn more personal interests by compromising on shareholders’
interest (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994).
A CEO who is internally focused due to duality tends to seek, for instance, unrelated
diversification strategy to reduce his/her employment risk by sacrificing the interests of
shareholders (Hoskinsson & Hitt, 1990). CEO’s individual motivation to lower employment
ends up with leaving risks to shareholders (Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001). In
the same logic, CEO reduces the attention to external environments and becomes more attentive
to internal environments such as entrenchment (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994). This indicates
that a TMT under the CEO duality evaluates a technological disaster as a risk that would not
harm its interests and identities and is less likely to facilitate enactment by which natural
environmental issues are prioritized.
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Hypothesis 4: CEO duality will negatively moderate the technological disaster and TMT
attention relationships.

Family Influence
Aiming at inter-generational succession, family firms tend to maintain family identity and
influence in an organization for a long-term period time. The family goal induces a firm to
allocate more efforts and resources to managing its social reputation and the ties with
stakeholders (Duh, Belak, & Milfelner, 2010) and to adopt policies that demands a long-term
commitment (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Although the policies need substantial capital
investment that reduces financial slacks (Hart & Ahuja, 1996) and undermines a short-term
profitability (Chrisman, Mernili, & Misra, 2013), family firms often assume the risks, as they
believe environmentally irresponsible actions could adversely affect family affective wealth such
as the loss of family influence that could discontinue their long-term succession planning
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007).
Family influence increases commitment (Zahra et al., 2008) and empowerment
(Eddleston, Kellermanns, & Zellweger, 2012), thus enabling managers to consider taking more
risks for affective needs of families (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Hernandez (2012) proposes that
the effect of family influence on managers’ cognitive process is enhanced when a mental model
for family value is shared between managers and families. This is, the mental model promotes
managers to act for and think like owners by prioritizing family affective needs. Similarly, a
TMT under family influence will have a negatively framed perspective on the possibility of
being involved in a technological disaster, which will harm the reputation of a founder’s family.
Therefore, TMT under family influence evaluates a technological disaster as a risk that adversely
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affects its interests and identities and is more likely to facilitate enactment by which natural
environmental issues are prioritized.
Hypothesis 5: Family influence will positively moderate the technological disaster and
TMT attention relationship.

Vicarious Learning
The underlying concept of situated attention is what a TMT focuses on and behaves
depends on the particular context its organization is located in (Ocasio, 1997). As TMT
managers affiliated with an organization are exposed to the same environments, within-group
variance in selective attention is smaller than between-group variance. It indicates that an
organizational cognitive framework has been built through social cognitive process (Levinthal &
Rerup, 2006; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006) by which individual cognitive frameworks influence one
another among TMT managers. This process is referred to as situated cognition (Elsbach, Barr,
& Hargadon, 2005).
Similarly, attentions of individual TMT managers are shared in the decision-making
process and the focusing of attention emerges from the social interaction among TMT members
who participate in communication channel (Ocasio, 1997).

The emergent attention in the

communication channel is referred to as situated attention (Ocasio, 1997; Schilling et al., 2003),
which is the product of communication through which TMT managers share and discuss what
they noticed and interpreted about the situation that organization is located in. The situated
attention is stronger when TMT managers can make temporal (i.e., frequency) and spatial (i.e.,
scope) commitment to communication (Ocasio, 1997). Therefore, the context that could
motivate them to actively participate in communication channels will moderate the impact of a
technological disaster on TMT attention to natural environmental issues.
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Given that a disaster triggers uncertainties (Pearson & Clair, 1998), firms are motivated
to learn other firms’ environmental practices and strategies to reduce uncertainties, thus
facilitating situated attention to natural environmental issues in a way that communication among
TMT managers is more frequent and intensive. This is, it is notable that organizational
characteristics such as performance relative to aspiration level (Greve, 2003), a firm’s ability to
absorb external knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), and similarity to an accident firm (Baum
et al., 2000) increase the likelihood that TMT managers are motivated to learn environmental
strategies and practices from others.
Vicarious learning is distinguishable from experiential learning that firms obtain
knowledge by doing something new (Huber, 1991). Vicarious learning is referred to as “an
attempt to learn the strategies, management practices, and especially technologies possessed by
other organizations” (Tsang, 2002: p. 836). According to Tsang (2002), the attempt to learn
from others increases as managers highly perceive the needs for the knowledge and are exposed
to more information than they immediately need. Thus, I propose that organizational conditions
under which TMT managers are broadly exposed to and feel more needs for knowledge related
to a technological disaster enhances situated attention to natural environmental issues.
Geographic Similarity to an Accident Firm
Disasters increase uncertainties to firms (Weick, 1988). When firms identify highly
uncertain events, they tend to imitate the actions of other firms having similar organizational
characteristics to reduce uncertainties (Gentry, Dalziel, & Jamison, 2013; Peng, Tan, & Tong,
2004). As technological disasters that are characterized by low-probability and sudden
disruptions to external environments create uncertainties, firms relying on limited experiences
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and knowledge observe how other firms operating in the same industry address the consequences
to reduce uncertainties and acquire new knowledge (Baum et al., 2000).
Following the logic above, when the accident firm has similar characteristics to those of a
focal firm, the focal firm will make more sense of a technological disaster and intensively focus
its attention on possible spillover effect that would adversely affect itself due to geographical
similarity. Geographic similarity is referred to as the extent to which a focal firm is proximately
located with other firms (Lee & Pennings, 2002). Geographic similarity is characterized by the
situation where clienteles are commonly shared and firms directly and symbolically interact one
another (Lee & Pennings, 2002). Furthermore, the similarity provides a crucial reference that a
TMT socially compares its capabilities of addressing threats in a similar context to, and the
intensity of learning by observing others firms’ actions against an event increases organizational
attention (Greve, 2003). As a result, high degree of geographical similarity increases the
likelihood that a firm observes and learns from mistakes of an accident firm (Csaszar &
Siggelkow, 2010).
More specifically, motivation of a focal firm to vicariously learn and attention to the
relevant issues are stronger when information on the firm is observable and relevant so that a
focal firm could compare and infer possible scenario (Greve, 1998). It is reasonable to anticipate
that firms have similar strategic profile such as the location proximity of a focal firm and an
accident firm (Baum et al. 2000). In the context, TMT managers are more motivated to actively
communicate one another to share what they attended to and to predict the possibility that its
firm is involved in causing a technological disaster. The increased communication and
interactions will create higher TMT attention to natural environmental issues in the
communication channel.
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Hypothesis 6: Similarity to an accident firm will positively moderate the technological
disaster and TMT attention relationship.
Absorptive Capacity
Zahra and George (2002) define absorptive capacity as a dynamic capability to acquire,
assimilate, and apply knowledge in external environments. The capacity has been identified as a
critical property of a receiver who is better able to receive knowledge (Csaszar & Siggelkow,
2010; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). When absorptive capacity is high, firms are better able to
understand external environments, transform what they understand into knowledge, and increase
commercial outputs, thus contributing to a firm’s performance in a highly uncertain industry.
According to Lane, Koka, and Pathak (2006), insiders’ mental model and knowledge
making process is a major predictor of absorptive capacity. The author posits that insiders share
a mental model by influencing one another in the process by which knowledge is actively
transferred, shared, integrated, and created. In other words, a higher level of absorptive capacity
enables firms to readily note and understand the occurrence of a technological disaster and to
effectively share and integrate what they learned from the environments through transferring
tacit knowledge and experiences across business units of a firm (Baum & Ingram, 1998),
facilitating situated attention to natural environmental issues in the decision making process.
Therefore, the perceived impact of a technological disaster on TMT attention to natural
environmental issues is amplified when absorptive capacity facilitates received knowledge to be
transferred across business units within a firm.
Hypothesis 7: Absorptive capacity will positively moderate the technological disaster and
TMT attention relationship.
Aspiration Level
The primary goal of a firm is to create and sustain its profits and maintain its
attractiveness relative to aspiration level (Greve, 2008). Aspiration is referred to as
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organizational goals that create strategic change and risk taking (Shinkle, 2012). When firms
achieve a higher performance that exceeds a given goal, a TMT will find slacks resources are
available and support slack-driven distant search for non-core activities assuming risks (Baum &
Dahlin, 2007; Levinthal & March, 1981; Ren & Gou, 2011). Meanwhile, the failure to achieve
the aspiration leads a TMT to seek a problemistic search for the solution to the lower
performance relative to aspiration level (Greve, 2008) by focusing the specific problem.
During the process of strategic change, a TMT has been found to shape its selective
attention by both examining a firm’s historic performances and comparing competitors’ current
performance (Washburn & Bromiley, 2012) and, when a firm’s profitability is above its
aspiration level, to shift its attention from survival-necessitated performances (e.g., profitability)
to growth-oriented practices (e.g., organizational size) particularly (Greve, 2008).

Therefore, a

high performance above aspiration level enables a TMT to communicate with a broad range of
insiders about growth-oriented environmental practices and strategies away from the issues on
performance and profitability, and thus increase situated attention to natural environmental
issues.
Hypothesis 8: Performance above aspiration will positively moderate the technological
disaster and TMT attention relationship.

Attention as a Limited Resource
Attention is a valuable but limited resource within organizations (Laursen & Salter, 2006;
Rerup, 2009). Given that TMT attention is made after managers go through social-cognitive and
structural processes, the attention is an intangible resource that remains following competition
among issues in the firm’s decision-making channels (Ocasio & Joseph, 2005). As a limited
resource, TMT attention has been identified as fundamental to the exploration of environmental
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opportunities and active reactions against environmental threats (Hart & Dowell, 2011). It
indicates that managers assume risks and allocate resources to the extent that they believe the
presence of opportunities to explore and of threats to neutralize (King & Lenox, 2002).
In early studies, Daft and Weick (1984) posit that a firm’s strategic action depends on
how managers notice the existence of opportunities and threats and interpret their impacts on
their organization. This logic explains why some firms respond to radical changes such as a
technological disaster or deregulation (Cho & Hambrick, 2006) in environmental actions while a
majority of firms do not in a highly uncertain and complicated context where a huge amount of
information is created but equivocal (Delmas & Toffel, 2008; Kaplan, 2008).
Following previous studies, I suggest the allocation of resources and efforts into
environmental actions for the purposes of achieving legitimacy and competency depends on the
extent to which a TMT is concerned about and confident in natural environmental issues. The
more TMT is attentive to the natural environmental issues, the better it is able to understand,
interpret, and perceive the issues as threats that a firm can neutralize by maintaining
controllability over environmental issues (Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998; Sharma, 2000). A high
level of TMT attention to environmental issues is complete when managers are structurally
encouraged to pursue natural environmental issues and actively involved in sharing and learning
one another in the communication channel. At the moment, the TMT attention has ability to
control information to flow into a few selective directions and the controllability of information
flow leads to an organizational movement (Ocasio, 1997).
As an organization movement, a TMT will illustrate its attention in different ways to
neutralize the threats from a technological disaster. In this study, I theorize and examine a
preventive environmental action and a protective environmental action as the manifestation of

35

TMT attention to environmental issues. For the preventive action, a TMT focuses on engaging
in developing an environmental competency by controlling information flow (Bansal, 2003;
King & Lenox, 2002). For the protective action, TMT focuses on achieving or maintaining
environmental legitimacy by relying environmental expertise of the third party (Russo & Fouts,
1997).
TMT Attention to the Natural Environment and Environmental Competency
Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009) define a preventive environmental action as an organizational
effort to “minimize or eliminate the creation of toxic chemical agents during the various stages
of production” (2009: p.106). When a TMT perceives an external event as a threat to its
competitiveness and profitability, the firm is more motivated to choose a preventive action, in
spite of its necessary risks of investment and required long-term TMT commitment (Dutton &
Jackson, 1987; Thomas & McDaniel, 1990).
Highly attentive TMT to environmental issues has been found to better identify
expectations from stakeholders and try to actively figure out what they expect by leveraging
cumulative tacit knowledge and experience of eliminating pollutants during the various stages of
production (Hart, 1995; Hart & Dowell, 2011; Nardkani & Hermann, 2010). It means that high
attention to environmental issues helps TMT focus its attention on relevant initiatives proposed
by middle managers (Dutton et al., 2001) and stakeholders (Bansal, 2003). In the process of
focusing TMT attention to natural environmental issues, firms are better able to accumulate and
develop tacit knowledge and experiences as unique advantages and consider preventive
environmental actions that controls and eliminates pollutants of toxic chemicals and wastes that
exist anywhere in the whole stages of production (Russo & Fouts, 1997). Furthermore, adopting
the preventive environmental actions encourage a TMT to rethink and redesign the whole
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process to actively fight against loss-likely threats and have stakeholders choose their products in
both economic and environmentally responsible dimensions (Hart, 1995; Freeman, 1994).
Hart (1995) highlights a preventive environmental action as the function of making
organizations environmentally competent and enabling them to accumulate knowledge and
information through close relationship with stakeholders (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009). High
attention to environmental issues that encourages a TMT to have a faith in the presence of a
firm’s controllability in the natural environment is a determinant for adopting a preventive
environmental action in response to threats accompanied with the occurrence of a technological
disaster.
Hypothesis 9: TMT attention to natural environmental issues is positively associated with
preventive action
TMT Attention to the Natural Environment and Environmental Legitimacy
Following King & Lenox (2002) and Berrone & Gomez-Mejia (2009), I define a
protective environmental action as organization efforts to treat, recover, and transfer waste at the
end of a manufacturing process by complying with environmental regulations and expectations
enacted by stakeholders. Unlike the preventive environmental action that aims to eliminate
causes of environmental degradation or pollutants throughout the entire manufacturing process, a
protective environmental action focuses on gaining and maintaining environmental legitimacy at
a lower cost by outsourcing environmental protection activities to an independent, professional
firm having an environmental expertise (Christmann, 2000; Deephouse & Carter, 2005).
Adopting a protective environmental action enables firms to have favorable exchange conditions
with stakeholders, as they can gain at least environmental legitimacy (Desai, 2008).
However, the underlying problem of the protective environmental action is that as firms
rely on the 3rd party’s environmental competency to address environmental concerns, the reliance
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eliminates any opportunity to accumulate knowledge (Hart, 1995) and, thus, to develop natural
environmental competency (Russo & Foute, 1997). The primary motivation to adopt this action
was based on rational and economic decision, but it is worthwhile noting that the cost of
maintaining environmental legitimacy may exceed the benefit from favorable exchange
conditions, as a manufacturing process becomes more specific to the 3rd party’s environmental
competency that should be necessary when manufacturing lines are updated and redesigned
(Hart, 1995)
A TMT having high attention to environmental issues perceives them as threats to avoid
and thus seeks an economic way of having their firms look accountable for the natural
environment at relatively lower costs and risks than a preventive action (Barreto, 2013) and thus
to focus on the result, rather than process, of environmental actions. This protective
environmental action tends to focus on the waste amount that a firm would transfer and recycle
at the end of production lines (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Russo & Fouts, 1997), instead of
removing pollutants in the entire manufacturing process. Therefore, adopting the actions release
a firm from the concerns that the lack of environmental legitimacy could lead stakeholders to
ascribe damages of a technological disaster at least partially to a focal firm when a technological
disaster occurs. In sum, higher TMT attention leads to employing a protective environmental
action with which firms can fulfill regulative institutions and stakeholders’ expectations and
environmental legitimacy.
Hypothesis 10: TMT attention to natural environmental issues is positively associated
with protective actions.
Attention is an underlying mediating process in the strategy literature (Cho & Hambrick,
2006; Ocasio, 1997). In this study, TMT attention to natural environmental issues is the
manifestation of extended concerns about a technological disaster and the conviction of needs for
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environmental actions against threats from technological disasters. In the whole environmental
decision-making process, TMT attention plays a critical role in noticing, interpreting, and
selecting initiatives proposed from inside and outside of an organization (Ren & Guo, 2011) and
enables an organization to accumulate knowledge fundamental to developing environmental
actions and, more importantly, to champion organization-wide actions for uncertain capital
investments (Andersson & Bateman, 2000). Thus, how much firms engage in environmental
actions depends on the concerns that a TMT attends to as issues (Bansal, 2003) and the
convictions that it has as answers (Ocasio, 1997).
Hypothesis 11: TMT attention will mediate the effect of technological disaster on an
environmental action.
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CHAPTER THREE:
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Sample and Data
In this study, I offer a contingent model that describes how corporate governance and
motivation to observe and learn about other firm’s failure differentially affects the decisionmaking process for environmental actions. To test the conditional process by which a cognitive
process that causally links a technological disaster and a firm’s environmental actions, the
boundary conditions of the causality should be considered simultaneously (Hayes, 2013). For
testing these relationships, I chose industries where natural environmental issues were salient and
secondary quantitative and qualitative data were publicly available.
Through reviewing the literature on organizations and the natural environment, I
identified five industries that have been historically noted as heavy polluters because they
generate a substantial amount of wastes and chemical substances in the manufacturing process.
According to Reid and Toffel (2009), the firms that are affiliated with heavily polluting
industries have long been challenged by environmental activist groups and governmental
regulations. Those challenges have led the firms to be better able to capture the signals
regarding their potential conflicts with environmental demands than firms in other industries.
Following Nadkani and Barr (2008)’s two-step process, I narrowed my investigation to
five industries. First, based on Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT, 2008) provided by the
Center for Research on the Epidemiology by Disaster at the Universite Catholique de Louvain in
Belgium, I examined all industries that experienced a technological disaster at least once in a 10-
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year research window from 1994 to 2003. The industries were collected in the basis of a 2-digit
SIC and a 3-digit NASIC codes. For a 2-digit SIC code, 19 industries2 experienced a
technological disaster at least once during the study period, while, for a 3-digit SIC code, 53
industries went through any technological disaster.
Second, to narrow my research focus to methodologically and theoretically relevant
industries, I reviewed existing literature on environmental actions and performances (e.g., Bansal
& Clellend, 2004; Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Christmann, 2000; Sarkis & Cordeiro, 2001;
Walls et al., 2012). Among 19 SIC-classified industries filtered through the first process, I
could reach the five industries that have been commonly addressed as heavy polluters that
include pulp/paper and plastic manufacturing (NASIC 322, 326 or SIC 26), chemicals &
iron/steel manufacturing (NASIC 325, 331 or SIC 28), petroleum (NASIC 324 or SIC 29), metal
parts, semiconductor, machinery, automobile, ship, and aircraft manufacturing (NASIC 332, 333,
336 or SIC 37), and electric, gas and sanitary services (NASIC 221 or SIC 49) industries.
For SIC 28 (chemicals & iron/steel manufacturing), the scope of business characteristics
are relatively broader than other industries in terms of the number of distinguishable SIC codes.
Using the 4-digit SIC code for the sample firm’s primary business (Table 1), I classified them
into the businesses producing chemicals as a primary product and those processing chemicals to
produce their products (e.g., pharmaceutical preparation, medical equipment, toilet and soap).

2

The industries either directly or indirectly influenced by one or more technological disasters in an 10-year
observational period are as follows;
SIC 12 (Coal surface or underground mining), 13 (Crude petroleum, natural gas, and oil exploration), 15
(Residential and industrial construction), 20 (Food and beverage processing), 22 (Fabric/knitting mills and textile
goods), 26 (Pulp/paper products), 28 (Chemicals, plastics materials, synthetic rubber, paints and allied products,
fertilizers, explosives), 29 (Petroleum refining, asphalt paving materials, Oils/Greases), 37(Motor, aircraft, &
railroad manufacturing and transportation equipment) 40 (Railroads operating), 41 (Local passenger land
transportation), 44 (Water transportation), 45 (Air transportation), 49 (Electric/natural gas services & utilities), 50
(Auto parts & industrial equipment), 51 (Stationery and drugs), 56 (Clothing and apparel stores), 59 (Retailers),
79(Entertainment)
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Table 1
Classifying SIC-28 Sample Firms into Subgroups
Firms producing chemicals as a primary business
Segment (SIC)
Plastic Preparation (2821)
Biological Chemicals (2879)
Alkalies and Chlorine (2812)
Industrial Inorganic Chemical (2819)
Industrial Chemical (2819; 2869; 2813)
Paint (2851)

Firms
Rohm & Haas, Eastman Chemical, Dow Chemical
Monsanto, Amgen
FMC, Olin
Du Pont (Shifted from SIC 29 in 1999)
Praxair, International Flavors & Fragra, Air Product
PPG Industries, Akzo Nobel, Ferro

Firms treating chemical to produce primary products
Segment (SIC)
Pharmaceutical Preparations (2834)

Toilet and Soap (2844)

Firms
J & J, Merck, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Pfizer, SchuringPlough, Lilly (Eli), Abbott Laboratories, Baxter
International
Avon Products, Estee Lauder Cos, Colgate-Palmolive

This study uses quantitative and qualitative data collected from a variety of secondary
sources, including TRI (Toxic Release Inventory) database released and administrated by the US
Environmental Protection Agency, a sample firm’s annual reports that provide letters to
shareholders (LTSs), Compact Disclosure, proxy statement posted on the US Securities and
Exchange Commission, and COMPUSTAT. Having had to use multiple databases, I also
considered the availability of databases a critical factor in selecting the industries to examine for
this study. For example, transportation industries including SIC 40 (railroad transportation),
SIC 41 (bus & truck transportation), 44 (water transportation), and 45 (air transportation) caused
the most technological disasters during the observation period due to oil and chemical spills from
various collisions and mid-air crashes. Several examples include derailment of union pacific
railroad train on May 27, 2000, crash of Comair Flight 3272 on January 9, 1997 due to
inadequate standards for icing operations while in flight, and train collision near an Avondale
Mills plant in Graniteville on January 6, 2005. In spite of a great number of technical disasters
in the transportation industries, they have not been required to report their environmental
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performance to the EPA. These EPA-reporting exemptions made it impossible to measure their
environmental actions in my study.
Instead, I investigated all cases to find out whether the transportation accidents were
closely related to supply chains of other EPA-reporting firms in the heavily polluting industries
and reclassified the accidents into the corresponding industries, if related. For instance, the case
where a train collision occurred in the supply chain process of a petrochemical firm was retained
as a sample case for this study. Through this process, I identified five transportation accidents
that were incurred in the process of supply chain for chemical manufacturers and reclassified
those cases into corresponding industries: chlorine exposure from collided trains in 2005,
hazardous materials exposed from a derailed train in 2000, sulfuric acid and sodium hydroxide
spilled from a derailed train in 1998, sodium hydroxide spilled from a derailed train in 1998, and
gas leak from a derailed train in 1996.
Time Frame and Sample Firm Selection
As I aimed to test for the relationships between an event and attention and between
attention and action, endogeneity issues might arise from the fact that a firm’s environmental
action could motivate a TMT to be more attentive to natural environmental issues and
furthermore high TMT attention might reduce the possibility that technological disasters occur in
an industry. This reversed causality is possible unless a cause is manipulated to precede its
effect (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002).
For a hypothesized causality to remain valid, I aligned a technological disaster, TMT
attention, and a firm’s environmental actions in chronological order. As described in Table 2,
the independent variable, a technological disaster lagged the dependent variable, environmental
actions, by one year. For moderating and control variables, I used the same year data with an
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independent variable. Specifically, the beginning year of an independent variable, technological
disaster, was March 1994 through February 1995 before shareholder’s letters were published in
annual report around March to May 1995. For a dependent variable, a firm’s environmental
action, the beginning year was 1995. It is notable that there is a two-year time lag in the release
of TRI data, so the data release in 1997 is for a firm’s environmental performance of year 1995
(Lee, 2000). By using the secondary data on technological disasters that happened from March
1994 to Feb 1995, letters to shareholder published from March to May 1995, and Toxic Release
Inventory reported in 1997, I focused on designing this research to clarify a temporal causality.
With this research design, I again collected data for a 10-year observational window, and the last
year of IV was March 2003 to Feb 2004. To measure a firm’s environmental actions for year
2004, I used the TRI database of 2006.

Table 2
Databases and Time Period of Study

Period
Data
Source
Variables

Technological
Event
1994-2003

TMT
Attention
1995-2004

Environmental
Action
1995-2004

Vicarious
Learning
1994-2004

Corporate
Governance
1994-2004

Industry
Conditions
1994-2004

EMDAT

COMPACT
DISCLOSURE

TRI

COMPUSTAT

COMPACT
DISCLOSURE

COMPUSTAT

Independent

Mediator

Dependent

Moderator

Moderator

Control

Given that prior works in the environmental management literature have examined their
sample’s environmental performance and actions for 4 to 7 years (e.g., Bansal & Clellend, 2004;
Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Berrone et al, 2013), I assume that 10-year period of observation
is a sufficient number of period to reflect the other possible events than technological disaster
that potentially affect TMT attention for both the firms influenced by a technological disaster and
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those not influenced (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010) as well as to test for serial correlation (Arellano
& Bond, 1991).
Initially, I selected 15 firms in each of the five industries on the basis of sales in a fiscal
year of 1995, which is the beginning year of DV. However, the numbers were adjusted based on
the availability of database. Some firms which were publicly traded in the US stock market but
did not reach a minimum TRI-reporting threshold3 were not required to disclose toxic emissions,
and I dropped the firms who did not report the annual toxic emissions for the reason. Appendix
B lists the sample firms and provides basic demographics on each. I have constructed an
unbalanced panel comprising 99 firms: 17 firms in SIC 26 (Paper/Pulp manufacturing), 25 firms
in SIC 28 (Chemicals), 16 firms in SIC 29 (Oil & Gas), 24 firms in SIC 37 (Transportation
manufacturing), and 17 firms in SIC 49 (Utilities). As shown in Appendix B, I have 970
observations.
Measurements
Dependent Variables
Following Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009), I classified environmental performance into
a preventive environmental action that contributes to a firm’s unique advantage and a protective
environmental action that focuses on complying with regulative and normative pressures for
environmental legitimacy (Hart, 1995). Targeting at eliminating underlying sources of
environmental pollutions existing in the manufacturing process, a preventive environmental
action were operationalized by the difference in generated hazardous chemicals and wastes
between a prior and current year. Meanwhile, a protective environmental action was measured
by released chemicals that were recycled, treated, or transferred to other sites.
3

Individual facilities are required to disclose their annual toxic emissions to EPA when they have 10 or more fulltime employees and emit any listed toxic substances in excess of the minimum level (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia,
2009)
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Preventive Environmental Action Following Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009), Sarkis
and Cordeiro (2001) and Hart (1995), I define a preventive environmental action as a firm’s
effort to eliminates pollutants of hazardous chemicals and wastes that will cause environmental
concerns by coordinating a manufacturing process with environmental management. The
environmental preventive action necessitates the understanding of an underlying mechanism
whereby polluting factors such as toxic chemicals and wastes are generated and thus needs
capabilities of process management as well as the nature-environment-related knowledge (Hart,
1995). Prior studies measured preventive environmental action by summing up annual emissions
of chemicals reported to EPA and dividing the outcome by previous year’s emission (e.g.,
Chatterji & Toffel, 2010; Sarkis & Cordeiro, 2001).
Given that each chemical has different levels of toxicity, King and Myles-Shaver (2001)
applied a reportable quantities (RQ) measure to the calculation of chemical emission and
toxicity. For more advanced weighting schema, Berrone & Gomez-Mejia (2009) weighted the
quantity of each chemical emitted in a given year by its correspondent value of “human toxicity
potential (HTP) factor” (Hertwich et at., 2001), which associates the TRI reporting chemicals
with actual risks to human health by measuring toxicity in terms of cancer-causing vs. noncancer causing materials and the media through which chemicals are released (Berrone &
Gomez-Mejia, 2009). Although HTP is the most advanced weighting method in measuring
toxicity, the following three approaches have been commonly used, since the methods have some
strengths and weaknesses, as demonstrated in Table 3.
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Table 3
Comparison of Methods for Environmental Performance
Simple Aggregation
The total pounds each firm
reported to the TRI as
production waste, transfers
offsite, and emissions

RQ
Applying the weighting scheme
developed by EPA to serve as a
threshold for reporting
accidental spills – “Reportable
Quantities (RQ)” database in
the CERCLA

HTP
Applying “human toxicity
potential factor” to assign
different values to chemicals
in terms of media (e.g., water
& air) and carcinogens or noncarcinogens.

Strengths

Simple Calculation;
commonly used by the
media, non-profit
organizations, government;
examining institutional
pressure (Dosh, Dowell, &
Toffel, 2013)

Reflecting the fact that
chemicals differ widely in their
impacts by weighting each
chemical by its toxicity

Associating the results with
actual risks to human health by
measuring toxicity in terms of
benzene equivalence or
toluene equivalence and the
medium in which chemical is
released (air & water)

Criticism

Low precision (chemical
toxicity and medium not
considered)

Less precision (chemical
toxicity and medium less
considered) (Toffel & Marshall,
2004)

Hart to match between the
media in TRI and Human
Toxicity Potential (HTP),
particularly, land

Studies in the
management
literature

Chatterji & Toffel, 2010
(SMJ); Dooley & Fryxell,
1999 (JBE); Dosh, Dowell,
& Toffel, 2013 (SMJ)

King & Lenox, 2000 (AMJ);
Russo & Harrison, 2005 (SMJ)

Berrone & Gomez (2009)

Functions

To have a more realistic measurement for a proactive environmental action, I embedded a
HTP weighting into data (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009) and additionally used a simple method
to increase the validity of my measurement. First, considering that the actual risks of emitted
chemicals to human health vary across the sources of toxic chemicals such as water and air and
the levels of toxicity such as cancer-causing and non-cancer-causing substances (Hertwich et al.,
2001), I weighted each of emitted chemicals by HTP index. Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009)
suggest calculating the ratio of actual pollution to the predicted pollution based on the difference
in production volume between time t-1 and time t. The firms responsible for submitting TRI
reports should report the change rate in production volume at t in comparison to production
volume at time t-1. The ratio serves as a critical threshold of estimating whether the volume of
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emitted chemicals at t is excessive to the expected volume of chemical wastes at t in a facility
level.
PreEA it = Expected chemical release t – Actual chemical release it
[Formula-1]
ECR it = Volume of released chemical it-1 x (Changed ratio in production volume it) [Formula-2]
Where PreEA it denotes a preventive environmental action at year t for an individual
facility (i); ECR t denotes expected chemical release at year t for an individual facility (i). To
find the current year actual emitted volume of sample firms at a firm level, I transformed two
different units (e.g., pound, gram) of weight for emitted chemicals into a standardized unit,
pound. I also multiplied HTP index by each of corresponding emitted chemicals to find
standardized HTP-weighted chemical release at a facility level. I used VLOOKUP function of
an excel software program to match individual chemicals released from the same facility at both
current (t) and prior years (t-1). This matching at a facility level was critical since TRI database
provided a facility-level changed rate in production volume [Formula 2] so that I could calculate
a facility-level PEA, demonstrated in [Formula 1]. A poor match would result in an unrelated
changed ratio in production volume, which would be applied and multiplied by prior year
individual chemical release [Formula 1], thus misleading a current year expected chemical
release (ECR). Lastly, as firms have various numbers of facilities, I calculated a firm-level
environmental preventive action by summing up all facility-level PEAs [Formula-3].

Environmental Preventive Action = ∑ [(HTP-weighted prior year’s individual chemical
release at t-1 x the ratio of current year’s production to prior year’s production volume)
– {Reported individual chemical release at t – (Non adjusted individual chemical release
– HTP adjusted individual chemical release)}]
[Formula-3]
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The positive and greater value from Formula-3 indicates a firm’s active involvement in
reducing chemical release before the end of manufacturing pipelines. Meanwhile, the lower and
even negative value indicates a firm’s low involvement in preventing chemical release at a
corresponding period, as actual chemical release exceeds expected chemical release (ECR) at a
corresponding year.
Protective Environmental Action Following Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009) and
Sarkis and Cordeiro (2001), I operationalize a protective environmental action as the ratio of
reduced chemical release by recycling, treating on-site and transferring to other location for
further treatment to total chemical release of a corresponding year [Fomula-4]. This
environmental action focuses on achieving legitimacy from stakeholders through less active
environmental actions (Barreto, 2013; Hart, 1995).
For the numerator of a protective environmental action, I included items that represented
a firm’s effort to reduce chemical release such as recycling on-site, recycling off-site, treatment
on-site, and treatment off-site, which were all obtained from TRI database. As there was no
information on the media (e.g., land, water, or air) through which recycled chemicals were
originally generated, I followed the Berrone & Gomez-Mejia (2009) approach which adopted an
average HTP value of water and air media for individual chemicals [Formula-5]. For the
denominator, I used total chemicals generated by a firm (Sarkis & Coreiro, 2001). Regarding
total release, it is notable that HTP-weighted measure can more precisely capture the differential
toxicity of cancer and non-cancer causing chemicals on human health that come through water
and air media. As shown in Formula-6, I included reported individual chemical release and other
wastes at year t such as total release, production wastes, and one-time release. As these items
were not weighted by HTP index, I deducted non-adjusted individual chemical release such as
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fugitive air, stack air and water and then added HTP-weighted fugitive air, stack air and water
[Formula-6]

ProEA it = TCRE it / HAP it
TCRE

it

[Formula-4]

= (Energy recovery on-site + Energy recovery off-site + Recycling on-site + Reclying
off-site + Treatment on-site + Treatment off-site) x {HTP(air)+HTP(water)}/2
[Formula-5]

HAP it = (Total release + Production waste + One-time release – (Fugitive Air1 + Stack Air2 +
Water) + (HTP-weighted air1 + HTP-weighted air2 + HTP-weighted water)
[Formula-6]
Lastly, I calculated a firm-level chemical release by aggregating a current year’s total
release and wastes from a facility level. The formula of a protective environmental action at a
firm level is as follows [Formula-7]:
End-of-Pipe Protection = ∑ {(Current year’s chemical release recycled, recovered,
treated, and transferred to other sites x average value of corresponding HTP factors for
air and water media for an individual chemicals) / {Reported individual chemical release
at t – (Non adjusted individual chemical release – HTP adjusted individual chemical
release) }
[Formula-7]
As a protective environmental action was operationalized as the ratio [Formula-4], higher
ratio of end-of-pipe protection indicates that the firms intensively focus on minimizing released
chemical wastes and pollutions through recycling, recovering, and transferring to other sites,
whereas lower ratio means they engage less in the environmental activities. If a protective
environmental action is equal to zero, a firm does not make any efforts to reduce chemical
release and wastes by either recycling or transferring to third places. Meanwhile, if the action is
equal to one, a firm recycles all released chemicals and wastes for a fiscal year.
For the measurement of a protective environmental action, there should be no score
above one, since firms cannot recycle more than they released. However, it is notable that firms
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being scored greater than 1 are often found in this measurement. This is because I used the
averaged HTP index of two media following Berrone & Gomez-Mejia ( 2009), as TRI data do
not provide information on which medium a recycled chemical were originally produced through.
For example, when a firm releases chemicals only through air medium, the use of averaged value
that includes both air and water media may inflate or deflate the nominator. Although the
limitation in HTP-weighted measurement is present, the use of a simple method that does not
consider different levels of toxicity across chemicals may provide more rough estimation of a
firm’s environmental protective actions.
Independent Variables
To measure the occurrence of a technological disaster, I constructed the independent
variable as a binary variable using the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT, 2008). The EMDAT, provided by the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disaster at the Universite
Catholique de Louvain in Belgium, is widely used for academic purposes across multiple
disciplines including geology, environmental science, coastal ocean engineering, finance
(Coleman, 2006) and management (Oh & Oetzel, 2012). The EM-DAT database classifies an
external disruptive event into a disaster when the event falls under at least one of the following
criteria: “10 or more people are reported killed; 100 or more people are reported affected,
injured, and/or homeless; the government declares a state of emergency; the government requests
international assistance.” Among the reported disasters, I excluded the cases falling under
sequential disaster that acts of Nature such as hurricanes and floods directly harmed
technological capability of firms and thus resulted in human, financial, and environmental
damages, as previously mentioned.
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Following the DM-DAT classification, I selected the cases corresponding to
technological disasters that were directly or indirectly associated with the value chain and
manufacturing activities of the firms in my sample industries such as paper and pulp (SIC 26),
chemical (SIC 28), oil and gas (SIC 29), transportation manufacturers (SIC 37), and utilities (SIC
49). It is notable that a dozen reported disasters arose from transportation accidents such as
plane crashes, derailment of trains, and vessel crashes into bridges and harbors in the DM-DAT.
When a disaster’s cause was linked to employees who made a technological mismanagement
(e.g., a pilot’s poor decision making as a determinant of a plane crash), the case was excluded
since this study examined the acts of the firms only in the most polluting US industries where
TRI data are available.
However, given that shipping chemicals, oils and gases through railroad and vessels is a
crucial part of the supply chain for manufacturers, stakeholders tend to ambiguously categorize
them into a guilty group (Zavyalova et al., 2012). Thus, I included the cases that transportation
accidents occurred in supply chain activities in my sample industries. To identify the cases, I
collected information on accident locations, dates, and involved organizations reported by the
DM-DAT and investigated news articles and accident reports announced by NTSB (National
Transportation Safety Board) and narrowed down my selection to 24 technological disasters that
occurred in the five different industries during the observation period from 1994 to 2003
(Appendix C). Based on the operational definition of a technological disaster, 10 or more people
died or 100 or more injured by a controllable and adjustable accident, I coded 1 for the industry
that experienced one or more technological disasters in a given year. Otherwise, it will be coded
as 0.
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TMT Attention to the Natural Environment Ocasio (1997) defines it as “the noticing,
encoding, understanding, and focusing of decision makers’ effort and time on the issues and the
answers.” Following Ocasio’s definition, I measured TMT attention to natural environmental
issues by using content analysis of letters to shareholders (LTSs) that represent the focused
attention of executive-level decision makers (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008).

LTSs have been long

used to identify and analyze the manifestation of top management team’s primary attention and
communication (D’Aveni & MacMillan, 1990; Homberg & Pflesser, 2000). More importantly,
LTSs are one of the most frequently used narrative documents identified as having external
validity by previous studies (e.g., Short et al., 2010).
There are some debates as to whether LTS represents TMT attention or CEO attention,
but using LTS for this study is appropriate since the letters are published through the process of
coordinating the attention, interests, and prediction of TMT members through communication
and filtering them into the most salient issues in which members are commonly interested (Cho
& Hambrick, 2006). In this study, the letters were collected from multiple archived databases to
reduce missing observations and increase the reliability of data content. A majority of letters
were collected from firms’ annual reports posted on the website of U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, Mergent Online, and Compact Disclosure. These three complimentary archival
data enabled me to check whether LTS was reported in a corresponding year. Particularly, as the
letters were not a mandatory document for publicly traded firms unlike other reports legally
required by SEC, data collection was not smoothly made. As supplementary document, MD&A
and corporate information from Lexis-Nexis were used as references (Cho & Hambrick, 2006).
The period of documentation was the decade between 1995 and 2004. Publicly traded
firms issue an annual report that demonstrates a prior year’s performance and business
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environments during the first half of the following year. Firms publish an annual report of 2002,
for instance, which is published from March to June of 2003. The LTS published in 2003 is
supposed to reflect TMT attention in 2002 and early 2003 including January and February. In
order to capture the extent to which a TMT is attentive to the issues of the natural environment
for each year during the observational window, I reviewed the environmental management
literature to choose some seed words that are most frequently used in the top-tier management
journals4 and represent the natural environmental issues.
Although a few studies measure and empirically test the consciousness about natural
environmental issues, most of them relied on cross-sectional data using questionnaires and thus
could not account for possible analytical issues such as the possible influence of omitted missing
variable on TMT attention (endogeneity), the serial correlation of prior year’s attention to current
attention (autocorrelation), and inconstant variance across firms (heteroskedasiticity).
Additionally, few studies suggested an exhaustive list of words that indicate natural
environmental issues. As the dictionary representing the natural environmental issues has yet to
be developed, I employed an inductive approach to developing a word list, as suggested by Short
et al. (2010).
First, I collected 838 LTSs from 98 firms during the 10-year observation period. Second,
I examined all letters to identify the words and phrases that represent TMT attention to natural

4

Instead of referencing all articles, I list here alphabetically the authors and published year of the articles that I read
for the purpose of identifying the seed words: Aragon Correa & Sharma (2003), Bansal & Roth (2000), Bansal
(2004), Bansal & Clelland (2004), Bansal & Hunt (2003), Barnett (2007), Barnett & King (2008), Berchicci,
Dowell, & King (2012), Berron & Gomez-Mejia (2009), Berrone, Fosfuri, & Gelabert (2013), Bigley & Roberts
(2001), Chatterji & Toffel (2010), Christmann (2000), Coleman (2006), Darnall (2003; 2006), Demas & Toffel
(2004), Dibrell, Craig, Kim, and Aaron (2014), Dosh, Dowell, & Toffel (2013), Eesley & Lenox (2006), Etzion
(2007), Flammer (2013), Gill (2007), Hart (1995; 2011), King (2007), King & Lenox (2000), King, Lenox, &
Terlaak (2005), King & Shaver (2001), Knock, Santalo, & Diestre (2012), Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, & Hollingshead
(2007), Marguis & Toffel (2012), Oh & Oetzel (2011), Prakash & Kollman (2004), Roberts (1990), Russo & Fouts
(1997), Russo & Harrison (2005), Sarkis & Cordeiro (2001), Sharfman (1996), Sharma (2000), Sharma &
Vredenburg (1998), Walls, Berrone, & Phan (2012), Wang & Choi (2013)
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environmental issues and answers and assessed whether the words were aligned with the concept
of natural environmental issues considering the context for each letter. Judge and Douglas
(1998) posit the issues are not limited to the ideas of compliance with stakeholder expectation
manifested through environmental regulations and concerns and also include proactive
considerations going beyond compliance that are explicitly addressed in TMT strategic planning
process and are recorded within the firm’s official statement such as mission statements and
annual reports. Andersson and Bateman (2000) classify environment issues that businesses face
into air pollution, solid waste disposal, topsoil erosion, ozone layer depletion, population growth,
marine and fresh water pollution, toxic waste accumulation and disposal, reduction in
biodiversity, wetlands destruction, deforestation, and climate modification. Similarly, Carroll &
Buchholtz (2002) suggests eight key global natural environmental issues that include ozone
depleting, global warming, sold and hazardous wastes, fresh water quantity and quality,
degradation of marine environments, deforestation, land degradation, endangerment of biological
diversity. By definition, attention embraces not only problems or concerns but also the answers
to corresponding problems (Ocasio, 1997), I included TMT consideration of how to ameliorate
opportunities and reduce threats from the natural environments as answers in the category of
TMT attention to natural environmental issues.
Third, four experts who had expertise in the organization and the natural environment
literature assessed how closely the collected words were associated with the attention to natural
environmental issues and rated the association by using a scale ranging from 1 (not associated) to
7 (definitely associated). Following Cho & Hambrick (2006), I calculated inter-rater reliability
using Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC), which was 0.76. In the social science, when ICC
is larger than 0.72, it is considered that adequate reliability is present. Based on the scale, I
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retained any words that were rated 5 or more from the four raters. The raters and I discussed
some words that were dropped in the validation process, but were potentially associated with
natural environmental issues, and reselected some words on which we agreed.
Lastly, after going through the process, I compared the number of the words mentioned in
each of the letters to the total number of letter written in LTS in order to standardize TMT
attention to natural environmental issues. Among the three content analysis programs that are
accepted to management research, I used the Mac-version of LIWC that captures phrases as well
as words and provides text-highlighting functions to increase between-reviewer reliability of
selected words.
Moderating Variables
Concentration Ownership is operationalized by the percentage of a firm’s outstanding
shares held by shareholders who owne at least 5% of the equity or blockholders (Bethel &
Liebeskind, 1993; Fidrmuc, Georgen, & Renneboog, 2006). As my sample firms are publicly
traded firms, their ratio of the number of blockholder to the number of small shareholder is
smaller than the ratio for non-publicly traded firms. Also, the position of blockholders within an
organization is distinguishable and they draw more TMT attention than do small shareholders
(Earle, Kucsera, & Telegdy, 2005). For the measurement, I employed a continuous variable,
while some prior studies used a dummy variable with a threshold of 5% ownership held by a
shareholder (e.g., Li, 1994). Therefore, 5% ownership is widely used to identify whether
ownership is concentrated to shareholders.
Outside Director As this study aims to examine the influence of outside directors having
heterogeneous background, experience, and insight on business, I used the number of outside
board members with no personal or professional relationship with the firm (Arthaud-day et al.,

56

2006), as opposed to inside board members who have former and current employment
relationships and work for an affiliated organization.
Instead of using the proportion of independent directors to board size, using the actual
number of independent directors as a proxy helps researchers to better understand heterogeneity
in expertise and the possibility that various issues and answers are identified (Anderson, Mansi,
& Reeb, 2004). These benefits are particularly important in predicting its conditional effect on
TMT attention that is manifested through focusing time and effort on issues and answers.
CEO Duality a dichotomous variable was used to measure whether CEO serves as a
chairperson for the board of directors (Boyd, 1994). To identify CEO duality, I consulted def
(14) or proxy statement for publicly traded firm collected through corporate filings. When
duality is identified, the focal will be coded as 1. Otherwise, it will be coded as 0 (Tuggle et al.,
2010).
Family Influence In order to examine the influence of family members on TMT attention,
I operationalized it as a firm in which at least one or more family members serve as either one of
TMT members or chairperson of boards (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001). As family members are
those who are related by either marriage or blood to founding and owing family (Chrisman &
Patel, 2012), I will match the last name of current directors and officers to that of founding
family (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & Becerra, 2010). The information on the
founding family’s last name will be collected from Lexis-Nexis, web searches and company
websites and the information on the name of current directors and officers will be collected from
Compact Disclosure of 2005.
Similarity to an Accident Firm The variable indicates the degree of similarity between an
accident firm and a focal firm.

For the measurement of similarity in organizational size, Baum,
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Li, & Usher (2000) adopted context similarity operationalized by geographical similarity in
located latitude between a firm’s prior acquisition and a target firm. Similarly, I employed the
concept of geographical distance between the state that a focal firm’s headquarter was located
and the state an accident happened for the corresponding observation period. I used a dummy
variable coding 1 if a focal firm’s headquarter and an accident facility are in the same or
regionally neighboring state, and 0 otherwise (Tsai, 2000).
Absorptive Capacity Cohen and Levinthal (1990) conceptualize it as a firm’s ability to
“recognize the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” (p. 128).
The knowledge accumulated through investment enables firms to learn technology-based new
capabilities and information promptly (Nelson & Winter, 1982), thus increasing responsiveness
of R&D to value-creating or threat-neutralizing opportunities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Thus,
such learning incentives are increased when R&D intensity is high.
A few studies have empirically tested corporate-level absorptive capacity: Stock, Greis,
& Fisher (2001) who operationalize it as R&D intensity and measure it by dividing R&D
expenditure by annual sales; Zahra & Hayton (2008) use R&D expense for the measurement.
Following Cohen and Levinthal (1990), I will draw on R&D intensity operationalized as R&D
expense divided by sales to measure absorptive capacity of publicly traded firms. As the target
firms are all publicly traded S&P 1500 firms, the financial data are available.
Performance relative to aspiration Levels is defined as a mixture of social performance
level and historical performance level (Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996; Park, 2007). Following
Bromiley and Harris (2014) and Greve (2003), I used weighted average model that combine
historical and social aspiration in the same model [Formula-8].
Ati = aiSAti + (1 – a1) HAti

[Formula-8]
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Where A denotes aspiration level; SA denotes social aspiration level; HA represents historical
aspiration; ai represents a weight. For social aspiration (SA), I calculated the industry average
ROA, and ROS, as suggested by Greve (2003) and ROI during a current year. For historical
aspiration (HA), I used a prior year performance (ROA, ROS, and ROI) of a focal firm. In the
weighted average model, the weights for social and historical aspirations can be differentially
allocated in accordance with how each of social and historical performances looks salient to
TMT members
Among three values for the weight 25, 50, and 75 (Baum, Rowley, & Shipilov, 2005), I
put equal weights between the two aspirations by selecting the value of 0.5. For the robustness
of measurement, I also applied 0.25 and 0.5 to the model as well. I used a dummy variable
coding 1 if a focal firm’s performance (e.g., ROI) is above the calculated aspiration level and 0
otherwise
Control Variables
For the analysis, I included several control variables that influence TMT attention and a
firm’s environmental actions. To control for financial capacity that possibly affect TMT
attention and propensity (Devers et al., 2013), net income was included. Assuming that large
firms in my sample may have more possibility of being attentive to natural environmental issues
than small firms due to their manufacturing capacity, I include firm size operationalized by
assets of a focal firm in a fiscal year (Zavyalova et al., 2012).
As industry munificence is characterized by industry-based stabilized environments due
to growth, and opportunities (Dess & Beard, 1984), abundant industries might lead a TMT to be
less attentive to its financial performance than scare industries (Shepherd, Patzelt, & Baron,
2013). For the measurement of munificence, I used a standardized measure of industry sales
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growth to measure munificence over its recent 5-year period. For the measurement of
complexity, I took into consideration the number of firms in an industry and their market shares
based on sales. Following the logic of Herfindahl index, I summed up the squared market shares
of all firms in an industry. The outcome, 1, indicates a monopolistic market while 0 means
perfect competition of the industry.
All of these industry-level data were acquired from COMPUSTATE in the basis of the
primary two-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code (Lester et al., 2006) and I
calculated 5-year industry sales growth, its standard deviation, and the sum of the squared market
shares of all firm in each industry for 11 years from 1993 to 2003. These industry conditions are
necessarily considered since a firm’s environmental performance is anticipated to be associated
with the threats of competitors, the degree of demands for a firm’s primary products and services,
and the changes in technology.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
RESULTS
Following Baron and Kenny (1986) and Edward and Lambert (2007), I focused on
combining moderation and mediation to test for the conditional indirect effect of corporate
governance and vicarious learning (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). This moderated causal
step approach is distinguishable from a testing for mediation and moderation separately and a
subgroup approach, which tests for the conditional effect of corporate governance and vicarious
separately (Edward & Lambert, 2007).
Considering all hypothesized moderators in the same equation, a moderated casual step
approach appropriately suppresses possible inflated relationships among variables that should
otherwise have occurred. More importantly, the aforementioned approach has limited ability to
provide the direct evidence for the causality of a technological disaster to a focal firm’s
environmental actions, as mediated by TMT attention, with theoretically important boundary
conditions considered.
To test the conditional indirect effects of seven different moderators on a firm’s
environmental actions through TMT attention as a mediator simultaneously, I employed a
structural equation modeling (SEM) that identified the significance of path estimation among
these theoretical constructs and provided a holistic approach so that I could appropriately bond
attention-based view with conditional indirect process (Bagozzi & Yi, 2011). Within the overall
framework of a structural equation modeling, three different regression equations having a
demeaned first-difference estimation were placed to test for the causality of a technological
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disaster and a firm’s environmental actions, as mediated by TMT attention (Baron & Kenny,
1986; Edward & Lambert, 2007; Mathieu & Taylor, 2006).
To examine how firms were involved in environmental actions in response to a
technological disaster, I compared the levels of attention and actions that were hypothesized to
be different between a group exposed to a technological disaster and the other not exposed to
them by examining the coefficient for a technological disaster. I also investigated the effect of a
technological disaster on TMT attention, the interactional effect between the disaster and
variables for corporate governance/vicarious learning on the attention, and furthermore the
mediating effect of the TMT attention.
Empirical Model
To estimate the coefficient of a technological disaster, I chose to use a demeaned firstdifferencing estimation, which allows researchers to test for the effect of the change in internal
and external events such as the change in governmental policy (Card and Kreuge, 1994), change
in industrial practices (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010), and the change in board independence
(Anderson et al., 2004). I used a demeaned first-differencing estimation in the SEM and
examined the difference between TMT attention of i at time t and a group-mean of TMT
attention of i, assuming that there is no effect of difference in between-group estimation (e.g., no
effect of unobserved time-invarying distinctions between Ford and Boeing on TMT attention).
The assumption is possible because an individual firm’s fixed effect is eliminated when a group
mean of individual effect is cancelled out with a fixed effect at time t that is assumed to be
consistent across the window of observation period. This is, controlling for unobserved timeinvarying effects of an individual firm, this demeaned first-differencing estimation makes the
covariance between change in technological disaster (IV) and change in error term equal to zero,
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thus correcting for endogeneity (Wooldridge, 2009). In the case that data to measure the
unobservable variable in error term are not available, a demeaned first-differencing estimation
can provide a solution to the omitted variable bias. Additionally, the first-differencing can
correct for serial correlation by calculating differences among pairs of observations and thus
making a non-stationary series stationary.
As data were randomly collected from various sources, it might be reasonable to assume
no covariance between idiosyncratic errors (ui) across different time points and no
heteroskedasiticity/ serial correlation. However, the results of Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg
test for heteroskedasticity demonstrated that variance was not constant

(chi 2= 47.86;

Prob>chi2 < 0.05), whereas the results of Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
indicated no first-order autocorrelation (F-statistic = 2.16; Prob>F = 0.15). As previously
demonstrated, the first-differencing made a non-stationary series stationary by calculating
differences among pairs of observations and thus eliminated auto correlations. To correct for
heteroskedasiticity, I used robust standard errors.
Given that I used a binary variable coding 0 if a sample firm is affiliated with the industry
experiencing a technological disaster at time t and otherwise coding 1, the panel data for this
study and the use of a demeaned first-differencing estimation made it possible for me to identify
whether the occurrence of a technological disaster leads to distinguishable difference in TMT
attention between two groups. After dummy coding, I calculated the deviation of TMT attention
to natural environmental issues at a specific year from the group-mean of TMT attention, as
previously described.
The effect of a public policy, which is characterized by a single occurrence such as
deregulation (Cho & Hambrick, 2006) and environmental rating (Chatterji & Toeffle, 2010),
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tends to have a clear distinction in period between pre- and post-occurrence, meanwhile
unprecedented but possibly repeatable technological disasters do not provide a clear post-disaster
period, since, unlike the duration of institutionalized governmental policies and industrial
practices, the duration of a technological disaster tends to vary across cases as they are not
institutionalized. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a technological disaster affects TMT
attention for a short-term period time such as up to 1 year following the occurrence and TMT
attention manifested in letters to shareholders (LTSs) does not reflect a technological disaster
that happened more than a year ago. This approach is different from the measures adopted by
other studies that examine the effect of an external event on a firm by focusing on difference in
TMT attention between pre and posttest tests.
Empirical Results
Path analysis using SEM was conducted with the statistical software package STATA
12.0. Table 4 shows correlations among constructs and Table 5 presents the number of
observation, means, and standard deviation for the variables in the regressions. In table 6, there
were low correlation (range of relationships = |.0| to |0.14|) among family influence, CEO
duality, ownership concentration, and outsider directors falling under the same construct of
corporate governance. There were also low correlation (range of relationships =|.0| to |.06|)
among similarity to accident firms, aspiration relative to aspiration, and absorptive capacity
falling under the same construct of vicarious learning.
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Table 4
Correlation Matrix
`Var

1

2

3

1.00
0.03

1.00

4

5

6

1.00
0.01

1.00

7

1. Pro

1.00

2. Pre

0.01

3. TA

0.07

4. TD

0.06

0.10

5. FI

0.01
0.08

0.05

0.05

6. CD

0.07

0.09

0.00

7. AC

0.03
0.01

0.00

10. GS

0.07
0.01

0.00
0.02

0.05
0.04
0.06

1.00
0.06
0.06
0.08
0.04
0.07

0.03

0.25

0.11

0.06
0.01

11. PA

0.01

0.04

0.02

0.07
0.03
0.02
0.01

0.05
0.03

0.09

12. MU

0.01
0.04

0.11

0.04
0.10
0.07

0.04

0.13
0.01
0.04

0.06
0.02

0.05
0.01
0.05
0.04
0.11
0.10

0.05

0.00

0.08
0.04

0.15
0.05

8. OD
9. OC

13. CO
14. AS
15. RE
‘

0.04

0.06
0.01

0.04
0.12
0.14

0.08
0.04

0.00
0.03

8

9

10

11

12

1.00
0.03
0.06

1.00
0.10

1.00

0.00

0.06

0.10

1.00

0.09

0.07
0.14

0.08
0.13

0.03

0.05

0.08
0.08
0.01

13

14

1.00
0.08
0.07

1.00

15

1.00
1.00
0.03
0.13
0.02
0.06
0.03
0.07
0.11

0.08
0.05

0.05

1.00

*Legends: Pro = Protective environmental action; Pre = Preventive environmental action; TA = TMT attention; TD
= Technological disaster; FI = Family influence; CD = CEO duality; AC = Absorptive capacity; OD = Outside
directors; OC = Ownership concentration; GS = Geographic similarity; PA = Performance above aspiration; MU =
Munificence; CO = Complexity; AS = Asset; RE = Revenue
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Table 5
Descriptive Statistics
Variable
TMT attention to natural environmental issues
ln_ Protective environmental action
ln_ Preventive environmental action
Technological disaster
Family influence
Duality
Outside directors
Ownership Concentration
Similarity to accident firm
Absorptive capacity
Aspiration
Munificence
Complexity
No. of employee
Asset

Obs.
838
875
874
970
970
954
951
915
969
628
968
955
955
934
970

Mean
0.17
5.14
23.29
0.20
0.17
0.81
9.22
25.55
0.17
0.04
0.67
0.07
0.04
36811.96
17517.93

Std. Dev.
0.36
4.37
0.15
0.40
0.37
0.40
2.68
24.37
0.38
0.41
0.47
0.04
0.02
73493.96
41597.25

The structural model I tested fits the data well. First of all, I compared my hypothesized
model with a saturated model, which used all of variances, covariance, and means of the
observed variables. As the saturated model becomes a reference, a small difference between two
models (chi2) indicates a good fit of the hypothesized model. The results were Chi2 = 0.116;
P>Chi2= 0.99 , indicating that the hypothesized model fits a saturated model. Additionally, I
examined standardized root mean square residual that represents the standardized difference
between the observed correlation and the predicted correlation. Given that the value less than
0.08 is considered a good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999), this absolute measure of fit was 0.001, which
indicates a good fit. Also, RMSEA (root mean square error of approximation) indicate good fit
(RMSEA =0.00), since its value of 0.05 or less indicate there is a good model fit. PCLOSE,
which tests the null hypothesis that RMSEA is no greater than 0.05, was 0.99, indicating that
RMSEA is less than 0.05 and supporting that the SEM model has a good fit.
Table 6 shows the results from SEM for hypothesis 1, the effect of a technological
disaster on TMT attention to natural environmental issues. The coefficient of the change in a
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technological disaster was s positive and statistically significant (b= 0.05; p<0.05 two-tailed).
As a demeaned first-differencing estimation was used, the coefficient for a technological disaster
suggests the extent to which TMT attention of i at time t was deviated from the group-mean of
TMT attention of i by one-unit change in technological disaster. The change in a technological
disaster by one unit is estimated to increase by 0.05 units in how much TMT is attentive to
natural environment issues (p<0.05 two-tailed). As the variable, a technological disaster, is
dichotomous, it might be more appropriate to interpret that when a technological disaster
happens, TMT attention for firms influenced by a technological disaster is estimated to be higher
than those not influenced.

Table 6
Parameter Estimates for Hypothesized Model using SEM
Path
Path Coefficient
Technological disaster  TMT attention
0.05**
TD*Ownership Concentration  TMT attention
-0.004**
TD*Outside directors  TMT attention
0.03**
TD*CEO duality  TMT attention
-0.01
TD*Family  TMT attention
0.29*
TD*Similarity to accident firm  TMT attention
-0.1**
TD*Absorptive capacity  TMT attention
-3.25*
TD*Aspiration  TMT attention
0.01
TMT attention  Protective Action
1.12*
TMT attention  Preventive Action
-0.02
Note. Model fit statistics: LR test of model vs. Saturated: chi 2(3) = 0.13, prob>chi2 = 0.99
Obs.: 476
***: P<0.01 (one-tailed)
**: P<0.05 (one-tailed)
*: p<0.1 (one-tailed)

z
2.09
2.10
2.19
0.09
1.34
2.45
1.78
0.09
1.82
0.36

Hypothesis 2, which states that ownership concentration positively moderates the
relationship between technological disaster and TMT attention, was supported (b= -0.004;
p<0.05 one-tailed). To interpret the results from the moderation analysis, I followed the
guidance provided by Aiken and West (1991) and Hayes (2013). Figure 3 demonstrated that
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when ownership was concentrated, the effect of a technological disaster made a TMT more
attentive to natural environmental issues.

Figure 3
Interaction of Technological Disaster and Ownership Concentration on TMT Attention to
Natural Environmental Issues

TMT Attention

0.05

0.03

0.01
Low
OC

-0.01
High
OC

-0.03

-0.05

Technological Disaster

Hypothesis 3 that outside directors positively moderates the relationship between
technological disaster and TMT attention was supported (b=0.03; p<0.05 one-tailed). It
indicates that the effect of a technological disaster on TMT attention depends on the extent to
which outside directors are involved. In Figure 4, the slopes of the lines correspond to the
conditional effects of a technological disaster on TMT attention for outside director. As shown,
the effect of a technological disaster about TMT attention was positive when the presence of
outside directors was high, while the effect was negative when their presence was low. That is,
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the effect of a technological disaster appears to be larger among the firms having high
involvement of outside directors than among the firms having low involvement of outside
directors, thus supporting hypothesis 3.

Figure 4
Interaction of Technological Disaster and Outside Director on TMT Attention to Natural
Environmental Issues

0.5
0.4

TMT Attention

0.3
0.2

0.1
0

-0.1

Low OD

.

.

-0.2

High OD

-0.3
-0.4
-0.5

Technological Disaster

Hypothesis 4 that CEO duality negatively moderates the relationship between
technological disaster and TMT attention was not supported (b=-0.01; p>0.1 one-tailed).
Although it was not statistically significant, the directionality indicates its potential negative
effect on the disaster and attention relationship.
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Figure 5
Interaction of Technological Disaster and Family on TMT Attention to Natural
Environmental Issues

0.05
0.04

TMT Attention

0.03
0.02
0.01
0

-0.01

Family=0

.

.

-0.02

Family=1

-0.03
-0.04
-0.05

Technological Disaster

Hypothesis 5 that family influence positively moderates the relationship between
technological disaster and TMT attention was marginally supported (b=0.29; p<0.1 one-tailed).
The result indicates that the effect of a technological disaster on TMT attention depends on
family influence. Among the firms that are influenced by a founder’s family, the occurrence of a
technological disaster has more positive effects on TMT attention than among those not
influenced by a founder’s family. Figure 5 illustrates the slopes of the lines correspond to the
conditional effects of a technological disaster on TMT attention for the presence of family
influence. The slopes were positive for both the firms being a family firm and those not.
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However, it graphically shows that among the firms influenced by a founder’s family, the effect
of a technological disaster on TMT attention is larger than among the firms not influenced.
For vicarious learning, I investigated three different moderators including similarity to an
accident firm, a firm’s absorptive capacity, and a firm’s achievement of aspiration level. None
of hypothesis was found to be statistically significant. Particularly, hypothesis 6 that similarity
to an accident firm positively moderates the disaster and attention relationship and hypothesis 7
that a firm’s absorptive capacity positively moderates the disaster and attention relationship were
found to be statistically significant but in an opposite direction.
Hypothesis 9 that TMT attention increase a firm’s preventive environmental actions was
not supported (b=-0.02; p<0.37 one-tailed). Meanwhile, the hypothesis 10 that TMT attention
increases a firm’s protective environmental actions was marginally supported (b=1.13; p<0.1
one-tailed). The result indicates firms having TMT attention higher by 1 point subsequently
increased its protective environmental action by 1.13 point.
I tested hypotheses 1 to 10 using structural equation modeling. Although a demeaned
first-differencing approach (within-estimator) controlled for endogenity and autocorrelation, it
lacked the treatment for heteroskedasticity. For the robustness of the result, I ran a demeaned
first-differencing regression model two times, one for hypotheses from 1 to 8 with TMT
attention placed as a dependent variable and the other for hypotheses from 9 to 10 with a firm’s
environmental actions as dependent variables. Three regressions used standard errors that are
robust to the presence of heteroskedasiticity. The results as seen in Table-10 were fairly
consistent with those from structural equation modeling except that ownership concentration that
was significant became marginally significant and family influence that was marginally
significant turned significant.
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Hypothesis 11 that TMT attention will mediate the effect of a technological disaster on a
firm’s environmental action was not supported (Indirect Effect on a preventive environmental
action: z=0.36; p>0.1; Indirect effect on a protective environmental action: z=1.37; p>0.1).
In sum, the moderating effects of outside directors and family influence on the
relationship between technological disaster and TMT attention to natural environmental issues
was found significant, as illustrated in Figure 5 and 6. The findings indicate that when the two
elements of corporate governance structurally distribute communication channels, the occurrence
of a technological disaster becomes more salient to a TMT. It is more interesting to consider that
neither of family influence (z=0.67; p>0.1) nor outside directors (z= 1.56; p>0.1) was
significantly related to TMT attention.
The results do support family influence and outside directors serve as moderating the
relationship between a technological disaster and TMT attention, while I did not found any
support for the moderating effect of variables for vicarious learning (Table-6). A summary of
the results for each hypothesis can be found in Table-7.
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Table 7
Summary of Results
Hypothesis
H 1: Technological disaster is positively associated with TMT attention to natural environmental
(NE) issues.
H 2: Ownership Concentration will positively moderate the technological disaster and TMT
attention relationship.
H 3: Outside directors will positively moderate the technological disaster and TMT attention
relationship.
H 4: CEO duality will negatively moderate the technological disaster and TMT attention
relationship.
H 5: Family influence will positively moderate the technological disaster and TMT attention
relationship.
H 6: Similarity to accident firm will positively moderate the technological disaster and TMT
attention relationship.
H 7: Absorptive capacity will positively moderate the technological disaster and TMT attention
relationship.
H 8: Performance above aspiration will positively moderate the technological disaster and TMT
attention relationship.
H 9: TMT attention is positively associated with preventive environmental action.

Result
Supported

H10: TMT attention is positively associated with protective environmental action.

Marginally
supported
Not supported

H11: TMT will mediate the effect of technological disaster on preventive environmental action
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Supported
Supported
Not supported
Marginally
Supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported

CHAPTER FIVE:
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
I began this study by noting the needs for understanding of how TMTs are sometimes
committed to a risky and short-term unprofitable environmental action and why they often fail to
be a key champion for the actions. Drawing on the attention-based view, I proposed that
corporate governance and vicarious learning lead a TMT to attend to and engage in various
levels of environmental actions across firms in ways that influence a TMT to reframe its
perspective (i.e., structural process) on technological disasters and facilitate internal
communication (i.e., social cognitive process), thus enhancing organization-level selective
attention to environmental issues.
To explain this mechanism, I highlighted the role of TMT attention to natural
environmental issues in achieving environmentally responsible actions as part of corporate social
responsibility (CSR).

Given that the primary group responsible for making CSR decisions and

actions is a TMT, it should be challenging to advance our understanding of a theoretical
mechanism of creating environmentally responsible actions without observing the social
cognitive and structural process of developing TMT attention. It is worthwhile to note the
ceaseless debates about the relationship between CSR and firm performance, which can be
partially ascribed to the lack of observation of decision makers and their attention. Without that
observation, researchers need to make some assumptions about the behaviors of managers in
which there has long been a gap in perspectives on CSR between stakeholder theory and agency
theory. The former theory assuming stakeholders as information and opportunity providers
views CSR as instrumental to performance, whereas the latter theory assuming that CSR harms a
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firm’s performance posits that CSR should be made within performance (Jo & Harjoto, 2012).
The gap has not been narrowed and the coexistence of the two dominant theoretical perspectives
has continued to incur an ambiguous relationship.
Drawing on virtual ethic theory, Chun (2005) sees a firm’s responsible behavior as
originating from organizational virtue run by managers who have strong aspiration values for
ethics. As an individual ethical value serves as an aspiration point, firms tend to engage in
responsible actions and satisfy stakeholders’ expectations. Having a more utilitarian perspective,
I argued that TMT attention strengthened by organizational characteristics is a key antecedent to
a firm’s environmentally responsible actions. As part of corporate governance that facilitates a
TMT to have a sensitive framework of natural environmental issues, ownership dispersal, a
founder’s family influence, outside directors, and separate functions of CEO and a chairman of
the board were hypothesized to have positive moderating effects on the relationship between a
technological disaster and TMT attention to natural environmental issues.
Using longitudinal data of S&P 1500 listed firms affiliated with heavily polluting
industries (Bansal & Clellend, 2004), I tested for the indirect effect of technological disaster on a
firm’s environmental action, as mediated by TMT attention to natural environmental issues.
Plus, I tested for the conditional indirect effect of corporate governance and vicarious learning on
a firm’s environmental action, as mediated by TMT attention. The 10-year period observation
was effective in removing an individual firm’s unique time-invarying unobservable effects so
that I identified the net effect of a technological disaster on TMT attention, the moderating effect
of a majority of the variables for corporate governance on the disaster-TMT attention
relationship, and the effect of TMT attention on a firm’s protective environmental action.
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Whereas a chain of events between a technological disaster and TMT attention and
between TMT attention and a protective environmental action were identified, the indirect effect
of a technological disaster on the environmental action was not found in this study. Specifically
speaking, I found the firms strongly attentive to the issues tend to marginally engage in
protective actions but no significant relationship between TMT attention and preventive actions
was found. This finding indicates that TMT attention might be a necessary condition, but not
sufficient enough to drive a firm’s environmental actions by taking risks. This suggests that
considering the boundary condition of the relationship provides a good understanding of the
following question: under what conditions does TMT increase its attention enough to take risks
and implement what they are attending to?
In Ocasio’s (1997) conceptual research, the relationship between TMT attention and
organizational movement is explained by managers’ identities and interests. Given that the
attention-based view follows the assumption of the behavioral theory of the firm (BTOF), a
dominant coalition’s bounded rationality leads to uncertainty avoidance (Cyert & March, 1963).
Unless there is managerial motivation to invest in environmental actions large enough to offset
uncertainty, selective attention is less anticipated to be linked to a firm’s environmental actions.
The associations between TMT attention and a firm’s environmental actions would be strongly
significant, if a TMT is better able to predict that environmental actions will contribute to
maintaining its identities and interests.
The underlying logic of behavioral perspectives in the environmental management
literature is that TMT attention to environmental issues motivates a firm to engage in either
developing environmental competency, achieving environmental legitimacy or both when a
dominant coalition in an organization perceives threats to its position. The attention enables a
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TMT to better understand and predict the extent to which technological disasters will bring about
the loss of performances by insiders, and a dominant coalition will be threatened due to the loss
and be replaced by a newly emerging coalition having an appropriate capability to be able to
address environmental issues (Baum, Flemming, and Singer, 1983; Cyert & March, 1963). That
is, high TMT attention functions as alerting the dominant coalition to the threats to continuity of
its identities and interests before managerial competencies and tacit knowledge held by the
dominant coalition are replaced by a group having a new cognitive framework (Gavetti &
Levinthal, 2000).
Corporate Governance and Vicarious Learning
The results of testing for the moderating effect of corporate governance and vicarious
learning on TMT attention indicated that ownership concentration, family influence and outside
directors increase the impact of a technological disaster on TMT attention, but none of the
variables for vicarious learning did. According to Ocasio (1997), rules and rule makers in an
organization play a critical role in influencing the direction of communication, formulating
organization-level attention, and strategic orientation (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). In that sense,
controlling shareholders, a founder’s family influence, and outside directors were identified as
critical players who effectively affect interests and identities of TMT by distributing the
communication channels.
Under such a crisis condition as the impact of a technological disaster, long-term oriented
goals influenced by controlling shareholders and family members were found to moderate the
relationship between a technological disaster and TMT attention. Further, extensive concerns
and interests ignited by outside directors were identified to distribute the communication
channels that have TMT managers more responsive to events that could adversely affect a firm’s
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long-term performance for various reasons and communicate more about relevant issues and
answer.
However, the findings that CEO duality did not support hypotheses led me to consider
the possibility that CEO duality may serve differently in the period of crisis than in the normal
business period. Unlike the traditional perspective of CEO duality that highlighted agency
problems such as entrenchment and risk avoidance caused by leveraging on his/her power for
his/her personal wealth, some new perspectives tend to view CEO duality as a driver of a strong
transformative leadership, particularly in the period of crisis and uncertainty such as when a
technological disaster and its negative spillover in an overall industry happen. I assume that nonsignificant results for CEO duality may represent its mixed effect on TMT attention. Therefore,
there seems to be a decent possibility of being able to explore the boundary condition of CEO
duality, particularly in relation to crisis management.
Unlike hypotheses related to corporate governance, none of three hypotheses for a firm’s
vicarious learning were supported in my study. They are conceptually important and meaningful
in that social cognitive processes that occur among TMT members are facilitated when
organizational characteristics provide decent conditions for learning other firms’ actions and
practices from a distance. A firm’s absorptive capacity, achievement of its aspiration level, and
similarity to an accident firm were hypothesized to motivate TMT members to communicate
with one another to learn more about why technological disasters happened and how other firms
addressed them.
I measured absorptive capacity calculating as R&D expenses divided by sales. About a
third of my sample firms did not report R&D expenses or allocate capital budget into R&D
activities during an observation period from 1993 to 2003. In the case that firms are strongly
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expressing environmental concerns and strengths through letters to shareholders without
budgeting R&D expenses, the moderating effect of absorptive capacity can be reversed, as
opposed to hypothesis 7 that absorptive capacity will positively moderate the disaster and TMT
attention relationship.
Furthermore, I also note the possibility that firms having high absorptive capacity may be
internally oriented when they seek solutions to potential threats created by unprecedented
disasters. This logic is possible when the attribute of absorptive capacity, path-dependency, is
considered. Absorptive capacity is a firm’s dynamic capability to absorb new knowledge
relevant to a firm’s existing knowledge system and thus enhance its routine and process (Cohen
and Levinthal, 1990). High absorptive capacity tends to lead firms to be externally oriented and
acquire and assimilate new knowledge and apply it to problems, but its relevance to existing
knowledge systems or path-dependence facilitates a firm’s routinization by selectively attending
to what a firm has to know based on what it knows (Todorova & Durisin, 2007).
Based on the concept of path-dependence, there is the likelihood that when an event
irrelevant to a firm’s knowledge system, such as a technological disaster, it might be less
attentive to natural environmental issues than a firm having low absorptive capacity. The pathdependence may have a TMT apply what it has acquired when noticing and encoding a
technological disaster and interpret the threat by focusing on internally routinized knowledge,
rather than focusing its attention on external cues for a solution (Gavetti, 2005). For the firms
having high absorptive capacity, a technological disaster might be an event that has a TMT take
its attention away from the issues encompassing the natural environment to the internal process,
as suggested by statistical results (z= -3.25; p<0.1; one-tailed).
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This study also found that high TMT attention contributes to a firm’s protective
environmental actions, while the attention does not lead to a firm’s preventive environmental
actions. These findings are consistent with the explanation for the boundary condition for a
firm’s environmental action. High TMT attention to natural environmental issues seems to be
sufficient conditions for achieving environmental legitimacy with low risks and costs, but a TMT
with high attention does not necessarily have a firm engage in environmental actions for
environmental competency that entails high risks and costs. The conditions that transformed
attention into motivation to implement green actions will explain a substantial portion of total
variance of a firm’s environmental actions.
Lastly, this study, observing and testing the effect of a technological disaster, contributed
to advancing our understandings of how firms engage differentially in environmental actions in
periods of crisis by looking into the process of environmental decision-making of a firm. Walls,
Berrone, and Phan (2012) examined the effect of corporate governance on environmental
strengths, assessed by a firm’s capability to improve environmental performance, and on
environmental concerns, operationalized by pollution prevention that provides organizations with
some advantages (Christamann, 2000; Klassen & Whybark, 1999). They found that board
independence positively affects environmental concerns or problems. Meanwhile, CEO duality
had no direct effect on pollution prevention.
Theoretical Implications
There are several important theoretical implications to this study. First, firms are taking
two possible environmental strategic actions: developing environmental competency and keeping
organizational legitimacy (Barreto, 2013). It is noteworthy to note that the fundamental reason
behind this strategic choice lies in the assumption that attention to natural environmental issues is
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a relatively limited resource compared to attention to competitive environmental issues. In this
study, having this limited and selective attention, a TMT tends to engage in protective
environmental actions rather than preventive environmental actions in response to threats from a
technological disaster. The findings are consistent with Sharma, Pablo, and Vredenburg (1999)
discussion that a firm’s preventive actions are associated with opportunities while its protective
actions are associated with threats.
Second, research into attention can bridge between organizations and general
environments. External environments consist of general, industry, and competitor environments.
These sub-external environments are conceptually aligned, and there are different dominant
theories for each environment. Firms can identify threats and opportunities that are unequally
distributed in the general environment. As the likelihood of effectively capturing opportunities
and neutralizing threats depends on the extent to which firms are concerned about (Dibrell et al.,
2014), learn about, and attend to the changes in general environment, attention should be a good
cognitive instrument that links firms with opportunities to explore and threats to prevent.
Therefore, the attention-based view can contribute to explaining why firms vary in responding to
an unexpected event in the general environment using three principles of attention.
Third, attention-based view complements the limitations of formalized decision making
process in a highly uncertain environment. The latter assumes that managers go through
scanning, understanding, evaluating, and forecasting external and internal environments in a
rational manner, and design and implement strategies with the results of the SWOT analysis.
The formalized approach to strategy efficiently leads to a firm’s actions and reactions against
events (e.g., changes in forces from competitors, buyers, suppliers, and regulators) that happen in
competitor and industry environments. Meanwhile, the formalized process of strategic decision
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making is limited in focusing resources and efforts on a few issues in the highly uncertain
environments driven by sudden and low-probability events from general environments including
a technological disaster. The attention-based view that partially adopts a sensemaking process
(Weick, 1995) suggests that social salience of a technological disaster elicit firms to enact their
environment and to give meanings to prioritized issues by categorizing and labeling unequivocal
issues, thus helping organizations make more sense of events that might not have been attended.
Therefore, the attention-based view is anticipated to continue to provide a theoretical lens to look
into the areas where strategies developed from a formalized decision-making process could not
reach.
Managerial Implication
Management studies have been mainly conducted with micro-level management research
into HR and macro-level management research into strategy divided. Meanwhile, businesses are
moving forward with the two domains integrated by having a TMT rationally attend to the voices
of employees (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008) and to stakeholders (Hart, 1995). The failure to
coordinate the integrative process of creating and attending issues is known to harm
organizational change (Dutton et al., 2001).
It is notable that the a top-down attention-making process might bias an organizational
attention to the issues that come from the bottom of its organization by providing a TMT with a
firm’s specific value, rules, and norms. It indicates the attention is focused not on the content of
issues but on the source of attention. Internal powers tend to be concentrated to those who can
promote issues in an organization, as insiders understand that their proposed issues are
effectively attended by a TMT when they are endorsed by those having an internal power.
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Given that a primary goal of a firm is to maintain a competitive advantage by nurturing
competitiveness, the emergence of a powerful coalition that has no association with pursuing the
organizational goal is referred to as organizational politics (Chang, Rosen, & Levy, 2009).
When insiders are not aligned with strategy but follow those who can create issues in an
organization, organizational politics often end up dominating an organizational strategy that is
necessary for effective decision-making. In sum, this study implies that biased TMT attention by
corporate governance is the manifestation of relying on the source of issues, instead of its
content, thus harming a firm’s capability to cope with external changes and identify opportunities
Second, although a number of governmental policies and regulations favorable to
stakeholders have been enacted and try to improve communal environments, the key group
which accepts and applies institutions to strategic management process is a TMT (Hiatt & Park,
2013) and its attention determines the level and type of environmental actions to implement, as
hypothesized. I provided a framework for how to develop environmentally responsible firms
considering corporate governance and vicarious learning. Understanding the mechanism by
which TMT attention to natural environment is created and leads to the action will help
regulatory agencies responsible for exercising environmental policies predict the possibility that
firms faithfully comply with environmental regulations and practices.
Limitation & Future Study
First, limited data availability constrained me to select sample firms only from five
different industries. Particularly, as a database for my dependent variable, TRI database,
annually reported to the US EPA (Environmental Protection Agency), was available only for
industries falling under the SIC first-two-digit codes from 20 to 50. This selection issue left
limitation in external validity.
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Second, following Cho & Hambrick (2006), I used 838 LTSs and analyzing its content
was an appropriate approach to assessing and identifying TMT attention to natural environmental
issues. As there was no systematic approach to studying and measuring organization-level
attention to natural environmental issues, I assume that the construct is a unidimensional.
However, given that its attention is the product of environmental concerns, conviction, and
champion that encourage a firm to be environmentally responsible, it must be worthwhile to
break down the construct further.
Although I developed the measurement of TMT attention in an inductive approach after
assessing a sample firm’s LTSs, I found some possibilities that the uni-dimensionality of TMT
attention to natural environmental issues might be segmented into three components based on
Scott’s (2003) classification of institution: TMT attention to regulative environmental issues,
TMT attention to normative environmental issues, and TMT attention to cultural environmental
issues. TMT attention to regulative environmental issues indicates the noticing and encoding
environmental regulations that look most salient in its business situation and interpreting them as
the concerns that have coercively regulated and legally sanctioned. The words5 for this category
include, for instance, ‘clean air act’, ‘clean air regulation’, ‘environmental law’, ‘environmental
regulation’, ‘environmental protection agency’, ‘federal energy regulatory commission’,
‘wildlife conservation’, ‘toxic release inventory’, ‘national environmental policy’, ‘Kyoto
treaty’, ‘ISO 14001’, ‘hydrocarbon law’, ‘environmental policy’, ‘coalition for environmentally
responsible economies’, etc.
TMT attention to normative environmental issues indicates the noticing and encoding
environmental social expectation that look most salient in its business situation, interpreting

5

The listed words are not exhaustive. Detailed explanations for the list of the words representing TMT attention to
natural environmental issues are available from the author upon request.
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them as the concerns that have normatively regulated and morally governed, and focusing its
attention on the corresponding solutions. The words for this category include, for instance,
‘accident prevention’, ‘air and fuel management’, ‘biodegradable’, ‘clean coal technology’,
‘clean energy’, ‘clean burning’, ‘community-based health program’, ‘cradle-to-cradle’,
‘environmental annual report’, ‘environmental practice’, ‘ forest management’, ‘forest
stewardship advisory’, ‘green diesel technology’, ‘groundwater treatment’, ‘pollution control’,
‘pollution prevention’, ‘recycle’, ‘renewable’, ‘sustainability report’, ‘sustainable forestry
initiative’, ‘ voluntary industrial toxics reduction’, ‘waste processing’, ‘water treatment’, etc.
TMT attention to cultural-cognitive environmental issues indicates the noticing and
encoding environmental taken-for-granted understandings that firms culturally support for
communal environments. The words for this category include, for instance, ‘a sense of
stewardship’, ‘accountability’, ‘citizen’s health’, ‘clean healthy environment’, ‘cleaner and
healthier place’, ‘commitment to the environment’, ‘community support’, ‘corporate citizenship’,
‘corporate social responsibility’, ‘duties and obligations of stewardship’, ‘environmental and
safety advance’, ‘environmental social performance’, ‘environmental benefit’, ‘environmental
concern’, ‘environmental cost’, ‘environmental excellence’, ‘environmental impact’,
‘environmental leadership’, ‘environmental stewardship’, ‘global climate’, ‘impact on the
environment’, ‘responsible public citizen’, ‘safety, health and environmental performance’,
‘sustainable development’, ‘value to their community’, ‘welling being of the community’, etc.
The classification might provide an insight into how TMT attention to natural
environmental issues did not mediate the relationship between the disaster and preventive
/protective environmental actions, as indicated by the tests for hypotheses 11 and 12. The
sample firms tend to use cultural-cognitive natural environmental issue in the most various forms
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of words and phrases (n=326) followed by normative natural environmental issues (n=138) and
regulative natural environmental issues (n=103). The results indicate that it might be more
convenient for TMT to use cognitive natural environmental issues than normative and regulative
ones, since TMT can exhibit its belief in the importance of nurturing communal environments
that might positively impress stakeholders and express the priority of shareholder’s interest by
signaling that its environmental actions are too much to harm financial performance.
Meanwhile, normative and regulative natural environmental issues entail detailed
information on the milestones of planned actions, relevant organizations, and expected outcomes.
The details might be the manifestation of TMT’s environmental concerns and confidence on the
situations surrounding it firm, given that TMT is supposed to summary its primary attention only
on 2 to 4 pages. It could imply that TMT attention to cognitive natural environmental issues
focuses on how its firms look environmentally responsible by exhibiting its attention to natural
environment, whereas TMT attention to regulative/normative natural environmental issues
focuses on how its resources and capabilities address environmental concerns by doing so
(Barreto, 2013). I anticipate that using segmented measures of TMT attention will improve the
nomological validity on the relationship between TMT attention and protective/preventive
actions in the future research. Additionally, the moderating effect of vicarious learning on TMT
attention is also anticipated to be more effectively identified.
CONCLUSION
This study focused on how a technological disaster affects TMT attention to the natural
environment, which, in turn, leads to environmental actions and what conditions differentially
increase the effect of technological disaster on a firm’s environmental action, as mediated by
TMT attention. I found empirical support for the ideas that a firm’s environmental actions
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seeking legitimacy depends on the extent to which TMT concerns about environments are
enhanced by corporate governance such as ownership dispersal, outside directors, and family
influence. These factors effectively influence a TMT to make more sense of the adverse impact
of a technological disaster on organizational legitimacy, and the structural attention leads to a
firm’s protective environmental actions. Meanwhile, the association between TMT attention and
a firm’s proactive environmental actions seeking environmental competency was not found in
this study. The findings provide some insights into how environmentally responsible firms are
nurtured and why a disastrous event leads to different environmental actions across firms.
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Comparison of Definitions for Technological Disasters & Natural Disasters:
Technological Disaster

Domains
Source
Non-Academic National Science and
Technology Council’s
Areas

Subcommittee on Disaster
Reduction (SDR )

NonManagement
Area

Management
Area

Pidgeon & O'Leary (2000,
p.16)

Technological Disaster
Definitions
“Technological hazards involve the release of
hazardous substances that impact human health and
safety, the environment, and/or the local
Economy. Hazardous substances are chemicals, toxic
substances, gasoline and oil, nuclear and radiological
material, and flammable and explosive materials, in
the form of gases, liquids, or solids” (Section for
Technological Disaster, 2008: p. 1)
“significant disruption or collapse of the existing
cultural beliefs and norms about hazards”

Gill & Picou (2008, p.796)

“… occur when breakdowns in technological and
bureaucratic organization systems lead to destruction
or contamination of the natural and built environment.
Most technological disasters involve contamination of
the
environment that challenges individuals' fundamental
expectations regarding their relationship with nature”

Baum et al. (1983)

Malfunction of a vast technological network of power
generating, production, and waste disposal system
Caused by “the technological failures that combined
with human and organizational factors to produce the
accident and were unanticipated interactions among
multiple failures in the system, tight coupling, design
flaws in the plant, the use of defective or
malfunctioning equipment, the use of
contaminated or sub standard supplies and raw
material, and the use of incorrect operating
procedures”

Robert (1990: p. 164)

Richardson (1994: p. 41)

“which cause extensive damage and social disruption,
involve multiple stakeholders and unfold through
complex technological, organizational and social
processes”
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Comparison of Definitions for Technological Disasters & Natural Disasters:
Natural Disaster

Domains
Source
Non-Academic US EPA; Federal
Emergency Management
Areas
Agency (FEMA)

NonManagement
Area

Classifying natural disaster into drought, earthquakes,
extreme cold, extreme heat, fires, floods, hurricanes,
landslides and debris flow, tornadoes, tsunamis, and
volcanoes

Center for Research on the
Epidemiology of Disasters
(CRED)

When an natural event fulfills at least one of following
criteria, it qualifies as a disaster: 10 or more people
are reported killed; 100 or more people are reported
affected, injured, and/or homeless; the government
declares a state of emergency; the government
requests international assistance

Department of Homeland
Security (DHS)

“Disaster can strike people in any community at any
time, building slowly, or striking suddenly without
warning.” DHS definition includes both natural
disasters and acts of terrorism.
“events, observable in time and space, in which
societies or their subunits (e.g., communities, regions)
incur physical damages and losses and/or disruption of
their routine functioning”

Kreps (1984, p. 312)

Alcantara-Ayala (2002,
p.112)

Management
Area

Natural Disaster
Definitions

Winn et al., (2011: p. 161)

Oh & Oetzel (2011: p. 660)

“some rapid, instantaneous or profound impact of the
natural environment upon the socio-economic system,
or as a suddenly disequilibrium of the balance
between the forces released by the natural system and
the counteracting forces of the social system”
Massive Discontinuous Change “significant, sudden,
disruptive change in the broader ecological or social
systems of which organizations and economic systems
are a part”
Significant and sudden disruptions ignited by an
unprecedented and unpredictable natural event (i.e.,
act of God) including “drought, earthquakes,
epidemics, extreme temperatures, floods, insect
infestations, mudslides, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis,
and wild fires”
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APPENDIX B

LIST OF SAMPLE FIRMS
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SIC 26: Pulp/Paper/Stationery Products6
Unit: Millions of Dollars
Name
Int’l Paper co.
Kimberly-Clark Corp
3M
Weyerhaeuser co
Tenneco Inc.
Boise Cascade corp.
W R Grace & co.
Temple Inland Inc
Avery Dennison corp.

Revenue (1995)

Ticker

19797

IP

13788

KMB

13460

MMM

11788

WY

8899

TEN

5074

BCC

3665

GRA

3460

TIN

3113

AVY

Name

Ticker

2795

DTC

2706

SON

2001

BOW

1605

PCH

1523

BMS

Rayonier Inc

1260

RYN

Rock-Tenn co

902

RKT

544

CSARQ

Domtar Inc.
Sonoco Products co
Bowater Inc
Potlatch corp.
Bemis co

Caraustar Industries

6

Revenue(1995)

As of 1995, the above 18 firms were primarily engaged in paper industry such as paper coated and laminated
(2672), paperboard mills (2631), pulp mills (2611), and corrugated and solid fiber boxes (2653). Among them, six
firms transformed their primary businesses during the observation period from 1995 to 2004; W R Grace shifted
from 2671 to 2819 (Industrial Inorganic Chemicals) in 1998, 3M shifted from 2672 to 2891(Adhesives and sealants)
in 2002, Weyerhaeuser shifted from 2621 to 0811 (Timber Tracts) in 2002, Tenneco from 2653 to 3714 (Motor
Vehicle Parts and Accessories) in 2002, Potlatch from 2631 to 2435 (Hardwood Veneer and Plywood) in 1998 and
back to 2611 (pulp mills) in 2002, and Rayonier from 2611 to 2823 (Cellulostic Manmade Fibers) in 2002 and to
6798 (real estate investment).
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SIC 28: Plastic Materials/Chemical Manufacturing/Pharmaceutical Preparation/Paint & Coating
Manufacturing)
Unit: Millions of Dollars
Name
Procter & Gamble Co.
Akzo Nobel NV.
Dow Chemical Co
Johnson & Johnson
Merck & Co Inc
Bristol-Myers Squibb co.
Pfizer Inc.
Abbott Laboratories
Monsanto Co
Colgate-Palmolive Co.
PPG industries inc
Lilly (Eli) & co.
Schering Plough Corp.

Revenue (1995)

Ticker

Name

33434

PG

21488

AKZOY

Baxter International
Inc
Eastman Chemical
Co.

20261

DOW

18842

JNJ

16681

MRK

13767

BMY

10021

PFE

17685

ABT

8962

MON

8358

CL

7057

PPG

6763

LLY

5014

SGP

FMC Corp
Avon Products Inc
Rohm & Haas Co.
Air Products &
Chemicals Inc.
Olin Corp
Praxair Inc.
Estee Lauder Cos
Inc
Amgen Inc
International Flavors
& Fragra
Ferro Corp
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Revenue
(1995)
5048

Ticker
BAX

5040

EMN

4509

FMC

4492

AVP

3884

ROH

3865

APD

3150

OLN

3146

PX

2899

EL

1818

AMGN

1439

IFF

1322

FOE

SIC 29: Petroleum Refining/Asphalt Paving Mixtures/Lubricating Oils/Petroleum & Coal
Products7
Unit: Millions of Dollars
Revenue(1995)

Ticker

73413

MOB

42163

DD

36106

BP

13368

COP

Ashland Inc

12167

ASH

Occidental Petroleum
Corp

10423

OXY

Unocal Crop

8133

Hess Corp

7302

Name
Mobil Corp
Du Pont (EI) De
Nemours
British Petroleum Co
Conocophiliips

Revenue(1995)

Ticker

Valero Energy Corp

3019

VLO

Pennzoil Co.

2385

Lubrizol Corp.

1983

EMCO Ltd

1086

Name

Quaker State Corp
Tesoro Petroleum
Corp
Holly Frontier Corp.

UCL
HES

Quaker Chemical
Corp

7

1035
7119
613
227

PZL
LZ
EMLTF
KSF
TSO
HFC
KWR

For SIC 29 (Oil and Gas), mergers and acquisitions frequently occurred, particularly early in 2000s. Therefore, I
briefly describe the history of the M&As related to sample firms in SIC 29.
Hess Corporation (HES)
In 1919, Amerada Corporation was formed by British oil entrepreneurs. In 1996, Hess Oil and Chemical acquired
10% of Amerada Corporation, and in May 2006, Amerada Hess Corp, changed its name to Hess Crop.
Exxon Mobile Corp (XOM)
It was formed in November, 1999, by the merger of Exxon (formerly Standard Oil) and Mobil (Formerly Standard
Oil of New Jersey).
ChevronTexaco Corp (CVX)
In October, 2000, Chevron announced acquisition of Texaco and the new firm was named ChevronTexaco, which
returned to the Chevron name in May, 2005. Therefore, the official name was Chevrontexaco Corp. from 2000 to
2005.
Conocophillips (COP)
It was created through the merger of Conoco inc., which was founded in 1875, and the Phillips Petroleum Co.,
founded in 1917, in August, 2002.
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SIC 37: Motor Vehicles/Aircraft Engines & Parts/Shipbuilding & Railroad Equipment
/Transportation Equipment
Unit: Millions of Dollars
Names
General Motors co.
Ford Motor Co.
United Technologies
Corp
Boeing Co.
Lockheed Corp.
Textron Inc.
Dana corp.
Navistar International
Corp
Paccar inc.
Magna International Inc

Revenue(1995)

Ticker

168828

GM

137137

F

22802

UTX

19515

BA

13130

LMT

9973

TXT

7786

DAN

6292

NAV

4848

PCAR

4512

MGA

General Dynamics corp.

3067

Trinity Industries inc

2496

Names
Gencorp inc

1772

A O Smith Corp

1544

Sequa Corp

1414

Harley Davison Inc.

4090.9

Alliant Techsystems
Inc.
Polaris Industries
inc

GD

119

2172.1
1113

Terex Corp

1030

Teleflex Inc.

2076.2

Standard Motor
Products Inc

663

Thor Industries inc

562

Winnebago
Industries inc
Oshkosh Truck
Corp.

TRN

Revenue(1995)

484
437

Ticker
GY
AOS
SQAB
HOG
ATK
PII
TEX
TFX
SMP
THO
WGO
OSK

SIC 49: Electric Services/Gas Transmission/Utilities)8
Unit: Millions of Dollars
Names
Southern Co.
Edison International.
Entergy Corp.
Public Service Enterprise
group
American Electric Power
Co.
FPL Group, inc.
(Formerly, Nextra
Energy Resource)
Duke Energy Corp.
Dominion Resources Inc.
CMS Energy Corp

Revenue (1995)

Ticker

Revenue (1995)

Ticker

9180

SO

3635

DTE

8405

EIX

3031

CIN

6274

ETR

1770

WEC

6164

PEG

1669

PNW

5670

AEP

1392

TE

5592

NEE

Hawaiian Electric
Industries

1295

HE

4676

DUK

Waste Management
Inco.

1144

WM

4651

D

Portland General
electric

983

POR

3890

CMS

Names
DTE Energy Co.
Cinergy Corp.
Wisconsin Energy
Corp
Pinnacle West
Capital Corp
Teco Energy Inc

8

Unlike other industries where a majority of firms were operating in the US, this industry includes many of largecap firms which were publicly traded in the US but were being operated out of the US. So, I selected sample firms
of this industry from top 150 firms in the basis of revenue as of 1995, which doubled 75 targeted firms for each of
other industries.
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APPENDIX C

LIST OF TECHNOLOGICAL DISASTER IN FIVE INDUSTRIES
DURING OBSERVATION PERIOD FROM 1994 TO 2003
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List of Technological Disaster in Five Industries
During Observation Period from 1994 to 2003
Type of Disaster: Industrial Accident (Explosion; Chemical Spill; Gas Leak; Fire) and Transport
Accident (Chemical/Oil/Gas Spill)
Date

Location
(Neighbor States)
Kinston near
Chapel Hill, North
Carolina (Virginia,
Tennessee, South
Carolina, Georgia)

Type

Sep
23
2001

Brookwood
Alabama
(Mississippi,
Tennessee,
Georgia, Florida)

Explosion of Coal Mine
Blue Creek (i.e., gas
explosion) caused by
methane gas

Aug
19
2000

Fatal Carlsbad
New Mexico
(Arizona, Utah,
Colorado, Kansas,
Oklahoma, Texas)

Explosion of Natural
gas pipeline explosion
and a transmission
pipeline ruptured;
blamed on corrosion in
a 50-year old pipe.

May
27
2000

Eunice, SouthWest Louisiana
(Texas, Oklahoma,
Arkansas,
Mississippi)

Derailment of Union
Pacific Railroad Train
and oil spill due to poor
track conditions of the
Union Pacific

Union Pacific
Railroad
(Publicly Traded
Firm; owner is
unknown)

Dec
8
1998

Saluda Western
North Carolina
(Virginia,
Tennessee, South

Highly volatile and
toxic Chemical Spill
(Sodium Hydrosulfite)

A tractor-trailer
(Non publicly
traded firm)

Jan
29
2003

Explosion of
Pharmaceutics Factory
caused by an
accumulation of
combustible
polyethelene powder

Relevant
Organization
West
Pharmaceutical
Service (publicly
traded firm):
manufacturer of
pharmaceutical
packing (e.g.,
plastic
packaging) and
delivery
Jim Walter
Resource Blue
Creek No. 5
Mine (Non
publicly traded):
Southernmost
Appalachian coal
producer for use
in electric
generating plants
El Paso Natural
gas (L.L.C)
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Damages

Related
Industry
SIC 28

Disaster
No.
20030070

13 Killed 3
injured

SIC 29;

20010569

12 Killed 2
injured;
property and
other
damages or
losses
totaled
$998.296;
steel
suspension
bridges
damaged
3500
evacuated;
total
damages
exceeds $35
million areas
polluted by
hazardous
materials
and residue
100
affected;

SIC 49

20000512

SIC 29

20000319

SIC 28

19980412

6 killed 36
injured

Oct
19
1998

Oct 7
1998

Sep
2
1998

July
1
1998

Jun
22
1998

Feb
26
1998

Carolina, Georgia)
Highland Pierron
Illinois
(Wisconsin, Iowa,
Missouri,
Kentucky, India,
Michigan)
Portland
Pennsylvania
(New York, New
Jersey, Delaware,
Massachusetts,
Connecticut,
Maryland, Ohio,
West Virginia,
Virginia)
Harper County
Texas (New
Mexico, Colorado,
Kansas, Oklahoma,
Arkansas,
Louisiana)
North Carolina
(Virginia,
Tennessee,
Georgia, South
Carolina)
Derailed at Cox
Landing, West
Virginia
(Pennsylvania,
Ohio, Kentucky,
Virginia,
Maryland,
Delaware)
Pocasset,
Oklahoma (Texas,
New Mexico,
Colorado, Kansas,
Missouri,
Arkansas,
Louisiana)

Chemical Spill
(Sulfuric Acid) caused
by derailment

Conrail (Non
publicly traded
corporation)

200 affected

SIC 28

19980318

Chemical Spill
(Sulfuric Acid; sodium
hydroxide) to Clarion
River

Genesee &
Wyoming
industries
(publicly traded
firm)

100 affected

SIC 28

19980305

Chemical Spill (Nitric
acid, sodium
hydroxide)

Burlington
Northern and
Santa Fe
(Publicly traded
firm; owner is
unknown)
N.C. Natural Gas
(Publicly Traded
Firm)

350 affected

SIC 28

19980285

400 affected

SIC 49

19980196

Chemical spill of
21,550 gallons of
Formaldehyde

CSX
Transportation
(publicly traded
firm; owner is
unknown)

512
affected;
total
damages
exceeded
$2.6
millions

SIC 28

19980195

Fire of Baroid’s metal
building that contained
caustic soda, potassium
hydroxide, and highly
corrosive compounds

Baroid’s Drilling
fluids inc. (a
worldwide
drilling fluids
company, a
division of
Dresser
Industries Inc;
non public traded
firm.)
Georgia Pacific
Corporation
(publicly traded
firm)

500 affected

SIC 29

19980058

25 killed 8
injured;
degradation
of
neighbors’
health and
property
6000
affected

SIC 28

19970370

SIC 28

19970198

Mislocating 2-inch gas
lines and the
construction company
later bit when digging

Sep
10
1997

Columbus Ohio
(Michigan,
Indiana, Kentucky,
West Virginia,
Pennsylvania, New
York)

Explosion of Chemical
factory, causing a
phenol/formaldehyde
resin mixture over the
grounds

July
19
1997

Flora Mississippi
(Louisiana,
Arkansas,

Crews used and destroy
tanker cars carrying a
flammable liquid

Dupont (Publicly
Traded Firm)
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Tennessee,
Alabama)

chemical and 6,000
residents were ordered
out of their homes
Gas Leak (Chlorine
gas) caused by the
derailment and emitting
poisonous chlorine gas

Apr
11
1996

Alberton Montana
(Idaho, Wyoming,
South Dakota,
North Dakota,
Washington)

July
25
1995

Texas City Texas
(New Mexico,
Colorado, Kansas,
Oklahoma,
Arkansas,
Louisiana)
Minneapolis
Minnesota (North
Dakota, South
Dakota, Iowa,
Wisconsin)
Samson Alabama
(Mississippi,
Tennessee, North
Carolina, Georgia,
Florida)

Explosion of Refinery

Oct
21
1994

Houston, Texas
(New Mexico,
Colorado, Kansas,
Oklahoma,
Arkansas,
Louisiana)

Jun
13
1994

Allentown
Pennsylvania (New
York, New Jersey,
Delaware,
Massachusetts,
Connecticut,
Maryland, Ohio,
West Virginia,
Virginia)
Belpre Ohio
(Michigan,
Indiana, Kentucky,
West Virginia,
Pennsylvania, New
York)
Balch Springs
Texas (New
Mexico, Colorado,

Gas Leak of 8 Pipe
Line due to lack of
effective operational
monitoring or pipeline
and of automatic
operated valves to
allow for prompt
detection of product
release
Servicemen for a local
gas utility arrived at the
scene in response to gas
odour reports, but
without the correct tool
to turn off the line.

Feb
28
1995

Dec
6
1994

May
27
1994

APR
14
1994

Burlington
Northern and
Santa Fe
(Publicly traded
firm, but owner
unknown)
BP (Amoco)
Publicly traded
firms

1092
affected

SIC 28

19960076

105 injured;

SIC 29

19950160

Fire of Chemical supply
company causing a
noxious cloud of
chlorine fumes

Hawkins
Chemical Co.:
Non public firms

200 injured

SIC 28

19950039

Fire of Plastic pipe
factory causing toxins
that irritate residents’
lungs and eyes

Samson Plastic
Pipe company
using the
chemical
Azodicarbonami
de to make PVC
pipes: Non
public firms
Exxon Pipeline
company;
Colonial’s
(Publicly traded
firm)

3000
affected

SIC 28

19940592

530 affected

SIC 28

19940544

UGI Utilities
Inc., publicly
traded firm

1 killed 379
injured

SIC 49

19940141

Explosion of Chemical
Plant; causing
cyclohexane & styrene
monomers to release

Shell Chemical
Co. producing a
thermosplastic
rubber, publicly
traded firm

3 killed
1700
affected

SIC 29

19940136

Explosion of a truck
loaded with pesticide
crashed into a highway

Non publicly
traded firm

4000
affected

SIC 28

19940109
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Kansas, Oklahoma,
Arkansas,
Louisiana)
Mar
24
1994

Edison area New
Jersey
(Connecticut, New
York,
Pennsylvania,
Delaware,
Maryland)

sign, spewing a cloud
of toxic smoke and
causing respiratory
problems
Explosion of a gas
pipeline damaged by
intense pressure from
repeated use of
construction equipment

Texas Eastern
Transmission,
owned by spectra
energy, which is
publicly traded
firm
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1 killed 58
injured

SIC 49

19940085
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